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HUMANISM AND
HUMAN DIGNITY

BY

LUTHER WINFIELD STALNAKER

NEW HAVEN

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TO

M. F. S.

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HUMANISM AND HUMAN DIGNITY

INTRODUCTION

IN a day when the smothering fumes of world devastation obscure the meaning and destiny of human living the need for vindication of human personality takes on a new poignancy. The direst devastation of all is not physical destruction but the annihilation of faith in human worth and human capacity. The ultimate totalitarianism is philosophical and religious. It is to be found in the Absolutism of the Hegelian tradition. The entire meaning of human effort is annulled because there is no evil for man to overcome, no time in which to strive, no freedom with which to wage the battle.

The champion of man against cosmic absorption is Humanism. The term has various meanings and in our own day has been frequently employed as an antithesis to Theism. It will be used here rather as an antithesis to Absolutism. Humanism is that view which vindicates the integrity of man.

The representatives of Absolutism especially chosen for consideration are three Neo-Hegelians: F. H. Bradley, Bernard Bosanquet, and Josiah Royce. They have been selected because they represent in common the Absolutist position with interesting individual emphases. The representatives of Humanism are William James and F. C. S. Schiller. The exposition of the Absolutists will be fuller than that of the Humanists for the reason that the author himself belongs to the latter school and in defending their position will be expounding his own.

A preliminary sketch of the main contentions of the two schools is needful before turning to the specific doctrines of time, evil, and freedom. The Absolutists of the Hegelian tradition seek through all the myriad facets of experience an ultimate norm of explanation that will answer for both truth and reality. They have proclaimed that norm to be a rational and systematic Whole of existence. In one fell swoop they have discovered both an epistemology and a metaphysics. This rational and systematic Whole is complete and perfect, embracing all meaning and all existence.

Absolutism's apostles have argued variously the theme of their master, Hegel. Yet each in his own way has reaffirmed the Absolute, short for the rational and systematic Whole of Reality, as the all-compelling Being. For instance, F. H. Bradley, one of a notable trinity of recent Neo-Hegelians, argues from the nature of thought as it appears infinitely both regressive and progressive. This character of thought implies the Absolute. For thought seeks through its regression and progression complete resolution. The Absolute is the only rational answer to thought's demand. Bradley offers as a positive manifestation of the all-inclusive Reality the experience of feeling as a unitary manifold. Since this

unitary manifold of feeling is a direct apprehension of Reality, it must reflect the nature of that Reality.

Bernard Bosanquet, another of the Neo-Hegelians, also finds his clues in the nature of thought; but his clue is in its inherently logical nature. Logical thought begins under the *nisus* of the Whole. Under this impulsion, thought strains toward the "Concrete Universal." By this "Concrete Universal" is meant, as I understand it, the embodiment in any unit of experience of the essential meaning and nature of the Whole of Reality. Conversely, Reality's essential nature is evident in any given content of experience that is organized and rational. So the logical impulsion of thought strives to make of every experience a significantly expressive unit. Bosanquet cites as indubitable evidences of the Universal, our basic, vital experiences: viz., the aesthetic, the social-moral, and the religious. These experiences reveal the essential logic of Reality as unity in diversity.

The third in our trinity of Neo-Hegelians is Josiah Royce. He admits that truth and reality can be intelligible on no grounds other than that of our purposes. But—and here is the characteristic insistence of the Absolutists—the realization, the fulfilment of our purposes lie beyond our finite grasps. From this it is inferred that our finiteness is not the ultimate element of us. Therefore, the aspirations of our purposes point ultimately to an Absolute in which those purposes are already assured fulfilment.

Plainly this trinity of Absolutists look beyond the finite with its limiting contradictions. They see in the very contradictions the *nisus* persisting on toward the non-contradictory Absolute. They are sufficiently representative of the Absolutistic tradition for purposes of this discussion.

Now the doctrine of Absolutism secretes clear implications for the fundamental categories of our experience. The experiences of time, freedom, and evil are fundamental categories. By admission of the Absolutists the Absolute has no significance outside its appearances in its parts, finite centers. If this is so, it is evident we cannot escape use of the categories of time, freedom, and evil. The Absolutist recognizes the categories as necessary, but necessary only as categories, only as modes or partial views inherent in finite experience.

Yet we paradoxical creatures look beyond our finiteness, beyond to the complete and perfect Whole as truly real. We cannot, then, hold these categories of time, freedom, and evil, incident to our status as finites, to obtain ultimately for the Real. But since these categorized experiences persist so intensively, they must be taken seriously. Therefore, our Absolutists have evolved the doctrine of the degrees of Truth and Reality; Bosanquet puts it in terms of degrees of individuality. These degrees are intelligible only on the presupposition of the Whole, by which the degrees can be determined, as the Real. So, we and all our brethren in the world of finites are a community of hierarchical micro-cosms.

All the incompleteness, all the loose ends and fragments, all the imperfections, all the multiplicity and diversity of the world as manifest in our experiences are swallowed up and redeemed in the Absolute. The need for the mind to complete an incomplete, to bind up the loose ends, to make a pattern of fragments, to make a unity of multiplicity and diversity, to reassure itself of perfection in midst of imperfection—all this need is answered in the rational postulate of the Absolute. The Absolute is the all-embracing "end" of a prolonged sorites; it is the unqualified integration of experience into a completed and perfect system thoroughly satisfying to the cry of human reason for intelligibility. The Absolutist might see through his glass darkly, but he is content with nothing less in reason than the Systematic Whole which illumines all the empirical facts, which, left to themselves as such, would remain forever unintelligible.

Against the rationalism of Absolutism Humanism assumes the tone of vigorous protest. To the Humanist, the arguments of the Absolutists are the rankest abstractions. The human mind, under impulsion of its purposes, has no experiences of arriving at a conclusive reality. At any step of the way our conclusions are provisional. We may make our conclusions with momentary attitudes of finality; but since life is a persistent flux, we know we always are pressing on to unfinished experiences. These ever-new experiences naturally are taking their toll from the old; there must be a reshaping of the content of our lives to meet new situations. And so we block out for ourselves the beliefs, concepts, judgments that will aid us in adjustment. James's *Will To Believe* is classic illustration of this doctrine. James says:

*Our passionate nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, "Do not decide, but leave the question open," is itself a passionate decision, just like deciding yes or no, and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth.*¹

From this we can understand the reluctance of the Humanist to commit himself to a metaphysic. A metaphysic usually claims to be universally valid by definition. And if our experience is the precarious, adventurous personal process proclaimed above, what grounds should we have for a metaphysic? At the best, if we exercise the "will to believe" and posit a metaphysic, we should recognize its strong, personal flavor. In fact, metaphysic is based, most plausibly, on ethics. If we had no experiences of values, should we be concerned about metaphysics at all? "For our interests impose the conditions under which alone Reality can be revealed."² That which we hold to be good is, naturally, that

1. *The Will To Believe*, p. 11.

2. Schiller, F. C. S., *Humanism*, p. 10.

which we desire to have conserved. We construct, then, a "real" world which will, we think, conserve those values. "At a blow it [Humanism] awards to the ethical conception of *Good* supreme authority over the logical conception of *True* and the metaphysical conception of *Real*."³

From this Humanistic position the corollaries for time, freedom, and evil are rather obvious. For the Humanist, each has a meaning per se and each maintains an existence in a fundamental sense in its own right. For an abstract metaphysics that postulates a reality given once and for all, time would occasion a "left-over," an unresolved antinomy. But Humanism, being voluntaristic and personalistic, declares the time-process to be a fundamental characteristic even of the mind and its development. And since the universe can be intelligible through no other source, time must assume the proportions of an ultimate datum.

On the corollary of freedom, Humanism declares that "human action is endowed with real agency and really makes a difference alike to the system of truth and to the world of reality."⁴ The world we know depends upon that to which we give our attention, upon our selection, our emphasis: "we carve out everything, just as we carve out constellations, to suit our human purpose."⁵ Now true freedom involves the possibility of real alternatives. And this implies that, if a metaphysical stand must be taken, it should root in the postulation of a pluralistic universe, with loose-jointed incompleteness.

To sum up, our Freedom is really such as it appears; it consists in the determinable indetermination of a nature which is plastic, incomplete, and still evolving. These features pervade the universe; but they do not make it unintelligible. Nay, they are the basis of its perfectibility.⁶

Humanism negatively pronounces its doctrine of evil by repudiation of Absolutism's strict interpretation of "God's omnipotence." This interpretation makes evil a "mere appearance." And this would rob our moral struggle of all meaning. But Humanism's presupposition of a pluralistic universe with alternatives of genuine freedom yields a rationale for our experience of the conflict of goods. This view also avoids the contradiction of trying to save God's goodness and power at one grand stroke, while trying at the same time to acknowledge some semblance of evil. And though the existence of a God might be conceded, he reasonably might be considered as only one among plurals. He might, on premise, be taken as wiser, more powerful; yet he could not nullify the ultimacy of the other members of the "republic" and, therefore, obliterate their distinctions of good-and-evil. And though this view leaves the outcome

3. *Ibid.*, p. 9

4. Schiller, F. C. S., *Studies in Humanism*, pp. 391-392.

5. James, William, *Pragmatism*, p. 253.

6. *Studies in Humanism*, p. 420.

hazardous, it gives all due recognition to the will, the initiative, and vital moral consciousness of the finite being.

Concisely the positions of the Absolutists and the Humanists have been sketched. For the most part the Humanists' arguments are aimed at refuting the Absolutists' position, in behalf of common sense. This is especially apparent on the issues of time, freedom, and evil. At these foci the meaning of human living is put on its severest trial. Because of this we turn to an attempt to make clear and convincing the Humanists' opposition. On each of these issues we shall present first the positions and arguments of the Absolutists. There then will follow, in each case, the Humanists' critical attack.

I

TIME

OF our Absolutists, Bradley is most pronounced in his opposition to time's membership in the company of respectable realities.¹ He admits the psychological distinction of succession in our experience.² But an appeal to the "fact of consciousness" he declares to be idle as a cogent argument for the reality of time. This could make of time nothing more than an "appearance."

Bradley offers in support of his position the treatment of time implied by science.³ Science, ideally, makes reality all-present. The phenomenon of the present is understood in no isolation: origin and development are essential to the nature of any phenomenon. The prevalent insistence upon the genetic method in science attests this. Further, we understand our phenomenon adequately only by the additional consideration of its potentialities for the future. Thus, in the phenomenon before him, has the scientist concentrated past and future; the reality is here, present, though for purposes of explanation it is analyzed in terms of past, present, and future. If we took time in ultimate seriousness, we could not consider ourselves to have a reality before us.

Granting the perception of change, Bradley calls attention to the necessary connection in the experience of the end with the beginning, so that in actuality we have one experience.⁴ The distinctions within are only ideal constructions. In this vein Bradley characterizes the significance of time as follows: "The duration of a finite centre in time, and a plurality of centres which do not share their immediate experiences as immediate, are . . . necessary ideas," but they are mere "ideal constructions," "special appearances the full and ultimate reality of which cannot in detail be known."⁵ These "special appearances" must be included somehow within the Whole; but this does not mean that they are real as they appear. In fact, after the analogy of the scientific phenomenon or the psychological linking of the end with the beginning, the succession has significance only in the Whole, which itself is not involved in the temporal series. The whole state of the world, as whole, cannot change at all.⁶ If, for the sake of argument, we admit the possibility of such a change, the question arises as to how we should have any grounds for diversity and identity in diversity. We say that succession, duration, and the like are necessary "appearances." But if the Whole were in flux, how should we have any ground for determining

1. *Appearance and Reality*, p. 206.

3. *Appearance and Reality*, p. 208.

5. *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 412.

2. *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 411.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 99.

6. *Appearance and Reality*, p. 220.

them at all? It is much more rational to hold that the Absolute is the possessor of many times, but is itself timeless.⁷

We might admit in Nature progress toward individuality and perfection; but this development is not essentially a temporal one. It is a logical development, rather, or one of principle, and not a process of time.⁸ The finite centers within the Whole are not themselves creatures of time. The finite being "is an immediate experience of itself and of the Universe in one."⁹ Paradoxically, but actually, everything in time has a quality which passes beyond itself.¹⁰

Our life [argues Bradley] has value only because and so far as it realizes in fact that which transcends time and existence. Goodness, beauty, and truth are all there is which in the end is real. Their reality, appearing amid chance and change, is beyond these and is eternal. But, in whatever world they appear, that world so far is real.¹¹

Throughout the drama of experience we encounter the conflict of change with the permanent.¹² Thus, concludes Bradley, the successions of time are reduced to mere "appearance."¹³

The reasons for this paradoxical relation may be metaphysically insoluble. But one anchorage we have: progress or decay, any sense of change or time, one and all are incompatible, if taken as ultimate, with the Permanent, the Perfection.¹⁴ "Within but not of" is the distinction made by Bradley of the time processes in their relation to the real. This, he contends, is illustrated by any religion of note: progress cannot be a characteristic of the Ultimate Reality. The Ground of our universe, the Guarantor of our values must have in himself "no shadow of turning."¹⁵

Psychologically, Bosanquet recognizes what he calls the "primitive sense of time," a sort of feeling of relative duration.¹⁶ The actual experience of practical selectiveness in everyday life impresses the fact of the time-sense upon us.¹⁷ The exercise of will in any one of a possible number of ways is a factor of experience that cannot be denied psychologically no matter what ultimate metaphysical standing might be accorded it.¹⁸ And for this will, time-succession is a necessity. Bosanquet further notes the effectiveness of "standardized durations" or "clock-time."¹⁹ This is comparatively artificial; but it has yielded actual and valuable results in scientific inquiry and in programs of social coöperation.

Therefore, on principle, time is an inseparable element of existence: "Suc-

7. *Ibid.*, p. 214.

9. *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 410.

11. *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 469.

13. *Ibid.*

15. *Ibid.*, p. 499.

16. *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*, *passim*.

17. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 125.

18. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 119.

19. *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 152.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 497-498.

10. *Appearance and Reality*, p. 318.

12. *Appearance and Reality*, p. 219.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

cessive appearance in space and time is what existence means."²⁰ This pronouncement loses somewhat of its force, however, when we recall that Bosanquet considers existence as only a contingent, dependent appearance within the Real. Yet I cannot avoid the counter-reminder that existence is the vital and necessary complex of experience without which we could know nothing.

Beyond these qualifications, Bosanquet takes the characteristic Absolutistic stand: granted the experience of practical selectiveness, it does not follow that we are justified in extending the significance of it beyond finite existence; it is not applicable to the Real, the Perfect.²¹ It is true that we have our ends projected along the way in our lives and that we evolve means for catching up to those ends; but those practical distinctions lose their sharpness even for us finite beings.²² We discover often that ends qualify means and means the ends; that, in short, they all simply are relative to each other within the whole intent of the process. Our author thinks the emphasis belongs upon the intent rather than upon the process as such. As a further substantiation of this, Bosanquet declares the true significance of teleology to consist, not in the process, but in the end. He says: "But in truth its significance does not depend on what comes first or last, but what there is in the individual real when it is apprehended in its completeness."²³ Therefore, teleology is not represented truly by any temporal tension of activity.²⁴

Again, we might look at the problem from the inside, i.e., at the explicability and significance of time for the consciousness of the individual. The mere lapse of what we call time and the intricacy of changes do not make the process explicable. It is explicable only through, or in, the self-maintenance of the individual as one, co-present, sentient being.²⁵ Even though we admit that the finite mind cannot hold to an "all at once," not even to the highest modes of experience of which it is on occasions capable,

this is no hindrance to the fundamental truth that what it does hold on to, what shows, as it were, through the mist, is both of one logical texture and of one emotional tissue with that which relative emphasis and distinction has for the moment, or for part or for the whole of an age or a lifetime, withdrawn from its distinct apprehension.²⁶

Continuing the argument with references to one's value-experiences, Bosanquet insists that value does not adhere to or consist in conscious states themselves, for those states have no ultimately distinguishable being.²⁷ The implication for the problem of time is that time as the necessary corollary of conscious states has

20. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 15.

21. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 125-126.

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 124-125.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 135.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 136.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 190.

26. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 279.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 309.

no ultimate meaning in the criterion of value. In fact, within the consciousness of the individual self, the primary condition of value is not time-processes, but continuity, the sense of timelessness. In other words, the very experience of progress has value only on the condition of a real perfection which, from the side of finite consciousness, is in terms of what Bosanquet calls "inclusive self-recognition." By this is meant the comprehensive, time-transcending, unitive inclusion within a total experience of the ideal and the process toward the ideal as inseparably related to the individual's recognition of himself as set within the Real, the Perfect.²⁸ As a summary of this line of argument, Bosanquet says:

Teleology which depends on a feature of the time-process is not a teleology which anyone but a pragmatist can affirm of ultimate reality; and the lesson thus suggested is only enforced when we come to ask ourselves what is the true test, even for organic evolution, for social progress, or for morals, of the purposiveness of a purpose.²⁹

To forge the links between the negative argument which has preceded and a more positive line, I quote: "Finite time-systems, as I understand, are beings which have no meaning, except as observed in reference to one another within the universe which they constitute."³⁰ Now the clear implication is that the change of the Whole as such is impossible.³¹ Thus is Bosanquet in agreement with the characteristic position of Bradley.³² If we should attribute to Reality progress ad infinitum, we should reduce it to linear movement only and thereby deny to it any systematic totality.³³ Now the Whole Bosanquet defines as "all that in any sense is."³⁴ Therefore, as the Whole is all that is, the change of the Whole as Whole would be utterly devoid of meaning.³⁵ Nothing can be experienced or predicated which is not rooted in the Universe itself. Any judgment we make must arise from a Universe presupposed as the ground of the judgment. The Universe may expand in all of its infinite directions; but always it is the Universe and the Universe's directions.³⁶

Even though we admitted the formal cogency of this logic, we still might ask, out of our perversity, how a non-temporal real can express itself in an infinite temporal series. The Absolutist answer is that the appearance of time-processes is an inseparable element of the finite parts.³⁷ But, while these finite parts continually appear as parts, each is a microcosm: every part has a feature for every feature of the Whole.³⁸ Therefore, as parts, the finite beings appear as temporal; yet as microcosms they belong to the non-temporal Real. It might

28. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 306.

29. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 138.

30. *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 203.

31. *Ibid.*, pp. 179-180.

32. See *supra*, pp. 6-7.

33. *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*, pp. 56-58.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 177.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 180.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 183.

37. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 295.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 298.

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34. *Ibid.*, p. 177.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 180.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 183.

37. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 295.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 298.

be an abstraction to speak of Whole and Parts. Since, however, such distinctions persist in our experience, we must recognize the Whole within every part. Time-processes become involved only as our persistent distinctions within the Whole shape and reshape the relations of these parts. We cannot accept these series as ultimately real, not even for the sake of progress itself; for if progress were ultimately real, to infinity, the gates would be closed against the very goal of progress, Perfection. "But," to conclude with the characteristic and central principle of the issue for Bosanquet, "we know that nothing really springs from past events as separate and successive, but only from a real totality that underlies them."³⁹

Royce, as I understand him, is primarily interested in social categories, the moral consciousness, and the fate of human values. It is through this approach that we find his most significant utterances on time. "Moral acts, as I have pointed out, occur in time. It is with reference to time, and in particular, to the time which any moral agent views as his future, that the agent himself, or anyone who judges him, estimates any act as good or as ill."⁴⁰ Time is recognized as a medium out of which come variety, novelty, and freedom.⁴¹ In the doctrine of Community, we find this emphatic statement: "If, then, the real world contains the Community of Interpretation . . . , this community of interpretation expresses its life in an infinite series of individual interpretation, each of which occupies its own place in a perfectly real order of time."⁴² By interpretation is meant the reading of meaning in the contacts and processes of our world, both of nature and of ourselves. Thus in the community of knowledge, we interpret ourselves to each other, and, through this source, we interpret nature. Now this interpretation always involves a relation of three terms: the "past self" as interpreted by the "present self" to the "future self." So the present interprets the past to the future ad infinitum.⁴³

Thus the world becomes an order of intelligibility through the time-process. This does not mean a set, uniform model of the time-process. In fact, Royce suggests relative rates and spans are involved in nature.⁴⁴ The evolutionary process, as we are able to reconstruct it, should impress upon us the fact that within the whole of the process, the rates and spans take on varying complexities.⁴⁵ This in no way vitiates the vitality of time; for the significance of the time-process is not in a uniform rate or span. Such insistence would load the time-process as a principle of intelligibility with an unnecessary handicap. It is

39. *Ibid.*, p. 302.

40. *The World and the Individual*, II, 361.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 369.

42. *The Problem of Christianity*, II, 270.

43. *Ibid.*, pp. 140, 143-146.

44. *The World and the Individual*, II, 226-229.

45. *Ibid.*, pp. 231ff.

true that we think and desire time-processes to be straightforward; we like to think that the laws of nature are temporarily invariant in their workings.⁴⁶ But these invariant laws are the postulates of our desires and conveniences. Time, as a kind of process, however, still holds as a universal mode of interpretation of our world.

We began with a rather emphatic recognition by Royce of a real time-order; we seem to end with an antirealistic view. But Royce did not mean the reality of his time-order to be taken realistically.⁴⁷ He declares the temporal fact as such to be more or less dissatisfying. And the presence of that dissatisfaction argues that the time-order is not an ultimate reality. Royce has meant, then, to hold the time-order as a reality only in the sense of a necessary finite mode of intelligibility: "It follows that dissatisfaction is the universal experience of every temporal being."⁴⁸ The temporal type of consciousness is too limited for our higher purposes.⁴⁹ We are thus led, on the basis of the realization of values, to transcend the time-order. Activity may continue to be restlessly endless; but the value experienced in our activity is always at rest in its own transcendent harmony with the real.⁵⁰ The time-order and the evolutionary process we may have ever with us; but per se they give us no guarantee as to the predominance of the good. Religious significance, for instance, can consist only in what the world eternally is.⁵¹ Moral and religious values are attained through devoting ourselves to "*losing our lives in the divine life*."⁵²

So, granting the activity and the time-process as a formal expression of that activity, the significant history of our lives seems to be resolved into the "progressive realization by men of the eternal life of the Infinite Spirit."⁵³ We are aware of successive states; but we are aware also of meaning, ideal value.⁵⁴ This implies that the winning of the value comes with the succession but is not identical with the succession as such.⁵⁵ Rather it is won by rising above or sinking beneath the succession. Yet we are cautioned to remember that the time-series is a *conditio sine qua non* of all ethical significance. Our experience of values is synthetic, then; but the ultimate satisfaction, consisting in the synthesis which transcends the temporal element, is taken as one argument for the nature of ultimate reality as time-inclusive but transcendent.⁵⁶

We finite consciousnesses, perforce, playing the time game, yet aware of gnawing dissatisfaction, postulate an Absolute who "*possesses a perfect knowledge*

46. *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, p. 399; *The World and the Individual*, II, 190-195.

47. *The World and the Individual*, II, 381.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 382.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 383.

50. *The Problem of Christianity*, I, 189.

51. *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, pp. 239-240.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 442.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 441.

54. *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, p. 431.

55. *The World and the Individual*, I, 425.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 426; *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 431; *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, pp. 425, 427.

at one glance of the whole of the temporal order, present, past, and future."⁵⁷ In other words, the Divine Will is possessed of the true insight that sees "the endless whole of future time, as well as of past time," as "not timeless, but time-inclusive survey, which embraces the whole of real life."⁵⁸ Processes there may be, but "All is eternal in the unity of meaning."⁵⁹ Royce's famous illustration of the synthesis of a "temporal sequence" by the experience of a series of notes in a melody is in order here: there has been the distinct experience of a series of sounds, but it is held as significantly present in a "flash."⁶⁰

One further question insistently intrudes itself: how can the future be included within such a synthesis, the future which is manifestly non-existent? Royce's answer in brief is that in every opinion, in every effort to adjust our will and conduct to the real, which we assume estimates all in the light of complete insight, we project the thoughts or deeds into the future that we may thus detect whether or not they are, in their implications, consistent with this eternally complete insight.⁶¹ This means "that the future, and in fact all the future, in all its individual detail, belongs to reality, and forms part of its wholeness."⁶²

I have presented the various emphases and arguments relevant to the status of time in our universe held by the Absolutists. Some interesting differences among them have been apparent: Bradley's rather summary relegation of time to the realm of "appearance" only; Bosanquet's more tolerant recognition of time as an inherent and effective procedure of the finite consciousness; and Royce's admission of it as a respectable constituent, yea, even model, within the Absolute. On the chief principle involved, however, there is essential agreement among these men: the transcendence of time by ultimate reality; or, in other words, the eternal nature of the ultimately real.

We have noted Bradley's arguments from the scientific treatment of time, from the psychological linking of end with beginning, from the logical necessity for the transcendence of time to preserve a unitary basis of our values, from the related logical necessity for a non-temporal Whole as the ground of identification and estimation of the internal processes, in brief, the necessity for a permanent. Bosanquet, admitting a teleology, argued that the true significance of a process consists in the intent, the logical end, and not in the process as such. Further, the essential nature of our experience is in the duration or sense of continuity—"inclusive self-recognition" is Bosanquet's term—rather than in the process as such. He clinches these arguments with a consummation in the logical ultimatum that the change of the Whole, which is the only true individual and

57. *The World and the Individual*, II, 374.

58. *Sources of Religious Insight*, p. 160; *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 433.

59. *Sources of Religious Insight*, p. 160.

60. *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, p. 456; *The Problem of Christianity*, II, 271; *The World and the Individual*, II, Lecture III.

61. *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, pp. 417-419.

62. *Sources of Religious Insight*, p. 160.

therefore the only truly real, is utterly void of meaning; and as a corollary to this he sets forth the logical dependence of all processes upon a "real totality." Royce has admitted the necessity of a time-order as a medium for the interpretation of nature to ourselves and of ourselves to one another. His insistence is not upon a content; it is for a time-order, on principle, as a necessary mode of intelligibility. But this is not ultimate, he concludes, in agreement with our other Absolutists. Our values can be guaranteed only in a world that eternally is.

In the Absolute, then, we have our time-processes included as necessary elements of our moral consciousnesses; but they are included "all-at-once," past, present, future, in one flash of insight or unity of meaning. Thus have our Absolutists attempted to meet the persistent paradox of how time can exist in the Eternal Whole.

Now the obvious sometimes needs mentioning. This I consider true with reference to the recognition on the part of all of the members of our trinity of the psychological fact of the experience of succession as an inescapable mode of apprehension.⁶³ Over this there seems to be no question. The question arises over the position to be granted such succession in the scale of reality. I shall attempt to show that, consistently, our Absolutists should accord the time-process essentially as vital a place as have the Humanists.

Our criticism is launched first at the arguments based on the psychological experiences of the finite consciousness. Here, we were told, the finite consciousness must link end to beginning to get any meaning; that it must presuppose the sentient whole of its individuality, its essential timelessness, to give the time-experience any significance; that a succession of experience must quench its dissatisfaction in an eternal unity of meaning. So can the psychological arguments of the Absolutists be summarized.⁶⁴

I respond with the query as to how there could be any sentient whole with a sense of its timelessness or any satisfactory quenching of dissatisfaction in an eternal unity of meaning if it were not for the equally necessary experience of time-processes. What significance would an eternal unity of meaning have for a mind which had no serious idea of a time-series? Royce's arguments against the mystic, as Royce has interpreted him,⁶⁵ would apply equally well here. Without a very vital sense of the time-series there could be no intelligible eternal unity of meaning; without such there could be no sense of a sentient whole of individuality; without an actual series taken seriously there could be no tying of end with beginning. As a matter of psychological fact, we do not tie an end to a beginning in a series to the obliteration of the intermediate steps or items; in fact, to have still the two items of a beginning and an end, leaves us with a series.

Now I am quite aware that there would be little point and possibly no mean-

63. See *supra*, pp. 6-7, 9-10, 11, 12.

64. See *supra*, pp. 6, 8-9, 11.

65. *The World and the Individual*, I, 77-87, 185-195.

ing in concentrating upon a succession as mere succession. It is doubtful if we could do that. I am insisting that there would be no possibility of talking about wholes and eternal unities of meanings if there were no distinguishable parts or steps in a given unit of processes. I can agree heartily with our Absolutists when they emphasize the intention of a process as its most essential and ultimate nature; but, I repeat, there could be no determinate intention without a concrete process. Even if I should gather up all the items of a process or of processes into one whole of meaning, must I not make a passage of undeniable actuality from that recognized whole to the explicit recognition of the meaning it has for me?

Suppose we admit that a process is essentially a logical development rather than temporal one. I cannot yet escape the perplexity as to how there can be any kind of development without time's being involved. It is true enough, I have no doubt, that when our attention is centered upon the logic of any development, we hardly are sensitive to the temporal passage involved. But that temporal element could be observed at any time we shifted the center of attention sufficiently to include that awareness. Surely there can be no development of any kind without distinctions. Even if a logical process is predominantly analytical, there must be in the very nature of the case distinctions and a consequent passage of time. It hardly need be said, then, that in synthetic processes, such as those of which Bosanquet makes much, or such as Royce's fulfilment of a projected purpose, distinctions and passages of time are their very bone and marrow.

The simple crux of the foregoing argument is that the time-process is an indispensable constituent of that very psychological whole or intention of "sentient whole of individuality" or sense of logical development, to use the various terms of the Absolutists. That clue I wish to pursue by indicating how the sense of an "eternal unity of meaning" obtains at all. Now obviously no finite consciousness can be said to outstrip time and encompass the whole of all possible processes and thus to gather all into a complete unity. It might be objected by our Absolutists: "But we have not spoken in terms of completed unity. We have used, instead, the terms of completeness of meaning, the logical completeness of a purpose."⁶⁶ The question then arises: how can we have any sense of such a completeness? I am interested in answering the question only to the extent of indicating the paradoxical, but none the less necessary, ultimacy of the time-element. To attempt a statement of my thesis, pending the argument, it is this: the only sense in which we have an experience of completeness is in our projection of any selected series or span experienced by us into a representation in its kind of all possibly conceived time.

To repeat the vitally obvious, the finite consciousness never escapes the toils of time. In fact, release from this would be unintelligible to us. Now there has been no intention, so far as I am aware, on the part of our Absolutists or myself, to intimate that time is identified only with a rigidly uniform rate or span of

66. See *supra*, pp. 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12.

time. What is meant is time in its essence as principle of distinctive succession. And this is, for us finite beings, inescapable. In fact, I seriously question Royce's dictum that the finite consciousness is essentially evil in that it is bound to temporal processes.

Upon reflection, we discover considerable distinction between the temporal processes as such and the contents involved in those processes. If we could have the contents measuring up to desire at all points, there would be no questions raised. The dissatisfaction of which Royce made so much is to be charged not to the temporal processes, but to the limitations of our universe which prescribe the contents of our experience, whatever those limitations might be. It is often objected, nevertheless, that time moves on with the elusive object of our desires; and that thus it denies us a full enjoyment of those desires, a completion of our ambitions. Again I insist that unfulfilled desires or disappointed hopes are not to be charged to the temporal processes. It seems to be much simpler and more reasonable to charge them to the incapacity of our own minds to respond with sufficient intensity or with sufficiently maintained intensity to comprehend an adequate span of temporal processes.

Now I maintain that any "eternal unity of meaning," any sense of transcendence means simply that we take a given process as a representative of all possible future times which might involve experience of like nature. We may attempt no projected construction of details in the future; but in transcending we declare the meaning of our given series significant for all possible times that might be affected. I attempt an application of my point to Royce's "melody": we can declare the series of the melody closed and thereby eternally significant as that melody; i.e., that in any relevant situation this melody-series will have been this melody-series and no other. We might offer a more extensive illustration: e.g., the eternal significance of the human soul. What more can we mean by this than that for all possible time we hold that the universe will be such in its processes that the human soul will be significant somehow to those processes?

I trust I have made clear my point that it is inconceivable that even the so-called eternal experiences can mean no more, psychologically, than a projected significance of a selected series for all time that might possibly be involved. We seem all too easily to have been overlooking the distinction between the processes and the contents. Contents may shift, be unsatisfying, demand transcendence; but in all of this we never can escape the time processes.

I think some justification for my position is found in our Absolutists themselves. It will be recalled that Bosanquet has paid his respects to the will and the necessary succession involved in the expressions of the will.⁶⁷ And in Royce especially we find considerable emphasis upon the will as characteristic of the real in giving determinate nature to the processes of experience.⁶⁸ The moral

67. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 119.

68. *The World and the Individual*, II, 361-373.

consciousness that enacts the purposes of our existence and points the way to the inclusive nature of reality cannot itself be what it is without time-processes.⁶⁹ The moral order can exist only through the processes of overcoming evil, attaining positive purposes.⁷⁰ Surely there is no way for evil to be conquered without some kind of a process. Again, I see nothing in Royce's designation of the "ought" as presently real in the "eternal order" that goes beyond the kind of transcendence I have been suggesting.⁷¹ If by "presently real" Royce means the fulfilment of the "ought," I insist the mind has performed the very kind of transcendence I have indicated; there has been no departure from temporal reference in this fulfilment. If he means no more than the presence of a moral obligation, the matter is simple enough: such always is present to the moral consciousness; it cannot be divorced from temporal processes; yet it is to be found in principle in all conceivable events.

"The spirit of a great ideal may be immortal; its ultimate victory, as we may venture to maintain, may be predetermined by the very nature of things; but that fact does not save such an ideal from the fires of the purgatory of time."⁷² I can agree with Royce in this proposition, if I am permitted to interpret it from the point of view I consider necessary to make it intelligible to experience. As intelligible to experience, how can there be any actually disparate distinction between time on the one hand and the "immortal" on the other? The distinction is not between time and an opposite, but between spans of reference. As has been said more than once, the tempos of experience and the spans selected might vary, but there is no intelligible feature of existence or possible existence that can be cut off from the temporal continuum through which the existence must be intelligible to us. In discussing the problem of mind and body development, Bosanquet has said: "There is no purely fresh purposive adjustment. There is no selective interest cut off with an axe from the continuum of interests."⁷³ I hold the principle can apply equally well here. So, no matter how we might transcend the contents of any experience, we never transcend a continuity with those contents and thus the temporal processes involved in the continuity of interests.

Next let us apply the argument to the finite consciousnesses in their relation to the Absolute; for these centers are admittedly necessary spokesmen for the Absolute. Bosanquet has said: "The moment we enter upon the reflective study of man, we learn that his individuality, his self-identity, lie outside him as he presents himself in time."⁷⁴ For me, the questions persist: how otherwise could the individual present himself than in time? And how could we infer so much

69. See especially, *supra*, pp. 4, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15.

70. *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, p. 46.

71. *The World and the Individual*, II, 372-373.

72. *The Problem of Christianity*, I, 56-57.

73. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 186.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 259.

as to his true identity if he were not being revealed to some essential degree in time? But Bosanquet says that man's nature is "in process of being communicated to him."⁷⁵ Further, our Absolutists have insisted that the finite individual is not a "fixed essence." He is instead a living world of content striving after non-contradiction.⁷⁶

Then, waiving as irrelevant for the present argument the implications as to a substantive self, I should say that the significance of time for the individual is clear. And it seems to me that if the true essence of the individual is to be found in an absolute transcendence of the temporal, he has been relegated after all to a "fixed essence." Yet the insistence of Bosanquet is against this idea of a "fixed essence": "The keynote is throughout that a true self is something to be made and won, to be held together with pains and labor, not something given to be enjoyed."⁷⁷ So again we see that the nature of the self involves processes. Royce I interpret as subscribing to this: "The genuine person lives in the far-off past and future as well as in the present."⁷⁸ Related to this consideration of the self as necessarily involving temporal processes even in the projected significance of himself is Royce's treatment of the Community. The fundamental nature of the Community for Royce we have noted above.⁷⁹ This Community is one of memory, expectation, hope: "How rich this community is in meaning, in value, in membership, in significant organization, will depend upon the selves that enter into the community, and upon the ideals in terms of which they define themselves, their past, and their future."⁸⁰ Again he says: "For our purposes, the community is a being that attempts to accomplish something in time and through the deeds of its members."⁸¹

Yet again Royce admits time as a necessary element in the overcoming of evil: "*No baseness or cruelty of treason so deep or so tragic shall enter our human world, but that loyal love shall be able in due time to oppose to just that deed of treason its fitting deed of atonement.*"⁸² Bosanquet, discussing the nature of mind and its relation to world-processes, asserts that minds come upon the scenes "when their conditions are present, and not before."⁸³ This plainly implies a world-process; in fact, Bosanquet means to indicate an evolutionary process. Time, then, surely is an essential element: the very fact that mind appears only at a given point when the process has resulted in conditions ripe for the occasion argues that the element of time is ineradicable. Bosanquet further substantiates this in the following passage: "Everything points to the general conclusion that life and mind respectively are the appearance at different stages

75. *Ibid.*

76. *Ibid.*, p. 289.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 338.

78. *The Problem of Christianity*, II, 67.

79. See *supra*, p. 10.

80. *The Problem of Christianity*, II, 52.

81. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

82. *Ibid.*, I, 322.

83. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 322.

of an omnipotential principle which elicits its whole definite content and development from its surroundings."⁸⁴

We may note again the recognition of the various stages. Further, let us assume an "omnipotential principle" or any other cosmic constant you please, the fact remains that new elements, beings—whatever I should call them—make an appearance which was not there before. So, when Bosanquet admits that "In apparent cosmic development, whether inorganic or organic, or logical, the rule is for the stream to rise higher than its source,"⁸⁵ he has, in this evolutionary principle, involved inescapably the time-element. How there could be any distinctions whereby one could know the "stream" as rising "higher than its source" without involving a passage of time, is inconceivable.

The chief insistence of the Absolutists is, obviously, that these processes are only "appearances" within the whole "apparent cosmic development."⁸⁶ The Real, the Absolute itself remains unchanged. The "spirit of the whole" has been declared the operative principle throughout the universe. And this spirit leads to the Absolute as the logical goal; for there would be no valid principle whereby one could arrest the process of a "spirit of the whole" at any point short of the all-inclusive Whole.⁸⁷ So the Absolute is the ultimate of this operative principle or "spirit of the whole."

Now I cannot repress the wonder as to how such a process can be a process and lead to the Absolute through its workings without involving time as an ultimate element. Our Absolutists insist, however, that they mean logical processes, not temporal ones: "All logical process is the re-shaping of a world of content by its own universal spirit."⁸⁸ Still my question persists: how can there be a process—call it logical if you wish—with distinctions and sequences sufficient for one to know there has been a "re-shaping of a world of content" without the employment of an actual time-element?

Let us in this connection look at the reputed transfiguring function of the Absolute: ". . . the Absolute transfigures, in embodying, a content."⁸⁹ Again my question interposes: how can there be any appreciable transfiguration without there being a time-process? It must be admitted, I suppose, that, given any selected unit of transfiguration, as a whole that unit does not change. But, recalling my argument as advanced just above,⁹⁰ this need not mean that the selected whole is any more ultimate than the process which is manifesting it. For, as I have argued, any so-called transcendent whole can be for us no more than the selected unit of experience extended as representative of all possible relevant experience. Therefore, since the Absolute is the all-inclusive unit of

84. *Ibid.*, p. 368.

85. *Ibid.*, p. 191.

86. See *supra*, pp. 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.

87. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 267-268.

88. *Ibid.*, p. 332.

89. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, pp. 60-62, 257-259.

90. See *supra*, pp. 14, 15.

all possible experience and that experience cannot be conceived in any terms other than those of our most significant experiences, it is logical that the Absolute should be engaged in processes of transmutations.

From this, the only valid ground that I can see for the contention that the Absolute must be in Infinite Thought to which all reality must be eternally present⁹¹ is our transference of attention from the transmutation processes to an all-inclusive survey of their unitary meaning. This latter view is no more important or ultimate than the former. In fact, the former way of seeing the Absolute assumes considerable emphasis when one is considering the manifestation of the Whole in finite centers, and especially when one takes seriously, as Bosanquet has done, an evolutionary process in which selves as the highest expressions of the Whole appear at a late date. Why should a timeless whole begin to appear in such selves, especially if the Whole is a self-contained Whole? Here we discover Bosanquet proclaiming the dignity of such selves. He says such a self is significant "just because it is a world, however subordinate in the whole scheme of the universe, in which the Absolute begins to reveal its proper nature, through and in union with a certain focus of externalities."⁹²

Thus have I attempted to establish further the logical necessity which would require our Absolutists to accept the Humanistic position on time. Now the Humanism of my adoption does not hold to a Time with a capital T, a realistically objective order that flows its invariable, inexorable, indifferent way. Therefore, I hold that Absolutism and Humanism are not so far apart as they might seem to be. I have called attention to the explicit recognition by the Absolutists of the inherent and necessary employment of temporal processes by finite consciousnesses. Our Absolutists admitted with even more pronounced emphasis that temporal processes were the indispensable condition of the moral consciousness; there could be no possibility of overcoming evil without involving time, was their admission. Bosanquet and Royce have included a recognition of evolutionary processes in their cosmologies.⁹³ And this, I have insisted, presupposes the validity of the time-series. In fact, Royce, as we have seen, has acknowledged the validity of a time-series for even the Absolute view.⁹⁴

Difficulties arise when the Absolutists relegate the temporal processes to relative unreality in the light of the Whole, the Real. Analogies from our so-called time-transcending experiences, such as the aesthetic and the religious, are used to indicate the nature of the Ultimate Reality as non-temporal; for in such experiences, the Absolutists say we perceive all-at-once, in terms of meaning complete, and not in terms of mere succession. They urge the logical argument that the awareness of even the temporal series and any appreciation of

91. *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 433, cf. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 387-391, for criticism.

92. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 193.

93. See *supra*, pp. 10-11, 17.

94. See *supra*, p. 12.

them demand the timeless as a fundamental presupposition. The culmination of all these arguments is the designation of the Absolute as transmuting all the incomplete processes of the finite consciousnesses into the timeless perfection of the Absolute.⁹⁵

I have tried to indicate, beginning with the analogies from our experiences as suggested by our Absolutists, that no transcendence which ignores the temporal element is possible; that as long as there is awareness in our experience, processes of some rate or span, however minute or vast in reference, are involved.⁹⁶ The eternal can mean to us no more than the projection of a selected series of experience into all future time which we can conceive as possible for the experience. So, I venture, in true Humanistic style, to usher my view within the portals of heaven itself, to the very abode of the Absolute. For, if the Absolute is transmuting our imperfections, it is itself essentially involved in processes. I do not mean this in the sense merely in which Royce has admitted it: i.e., a time-inclusive Absolute which is itself timeless. I mean that any Ultimate Being that is so engaged in transmuting its own constituents is itself in a process of change and therefore essentially involved in time-series. The relative spans might differ so that in comparison the Ultimate Being itself assumes the aspect of a Permanent. For all practical purposes, it is a (relative!) Permanent.

In conclusion, I would assert that consistently the Absolute is no more than a postulate: it serves to satisfy the desire of the finite consciousness for a permanent, reliable ground to conserve value that it knows only in and through temporal processes.

95. See *supra*, pp. 7, 9, 12.

96. See *supra*, pp. 13 ff.

II

EVIL

TIME involves the formal condition or possibility of our operating as volitional, moral beings. The problem of evil is involved in the possible nature of the content of our actions. What I am trying to say is that, given ourselves as creatures with volitional, moral consciousnesses, the expressive acts of our lives must be in terms of good and evil. A consideration of this problem is, then, logically our next step.

Let me restate succinctly my Humanistic position on the problem of evil. Positively, Humanism insists on doing justice to human experiences in their striving for adequate adjustment to the world and for the reshaping of that world, at any amenable points, for the conservation of our cherished values. Experience involves us consequently in many sufferings and other evils, whether from Nature or from ourselves. Whatever the reasons for these experiences, they are insistent and persistent. Without them we cannot conceive how we should be moral selves at all. The Humanist insists that there is no fact in our universe so important as our moral personalities.

From this basic fact, all metaphysics should be—or rather, are—elicited. So, whatever factors are integral to moral personality, always concomitant with it, should be recognized as real elements in our Universe. Negatively, the Humanist decries any view that makes the Ultimate Real such as to obliterate or minimize the vital distinctions of good and evil. Now the Absolute cannot, by the orthodox definition, appreciate these distinctions in the degree of virility and vitality with which we have experienced them and appraised them. With a Reality given once and for all in its completeness, our struggles and distinctions, defeats and triumphs, must be robbed of the significance they have had for us. Our Humanist insists on staying closer to the facts of experience and on postulating a universe wherein man's judgments of good and evil add to or detract from the actual significance of that universe. His is a universe in which our struggling yields us a positive result with every overcoming, and in which we may have as a real attendant the forward-looking hope of believing our struggles count for something ultimately.

Briefly let us recount the positions of our chosen Absolutists on this problem. Thus might we gird ourselves the better for our undertaking of proving them, in this respect also, to be obliged consistently to relinquish some of their emphases and to accede more nearly to the Humanistic position.

Bradley recalls first of all the basic principle of finiteness: the very existence

of the finite consciousness has its content by reason of its own impotence.¹ Our very finiteness has as its corollary, then, evil. Good and evil simply are one-sided aspects involved in finite experience.² The conflict between the two is inescapable for the finite. But, as we have observed of the Absolutist position a number of times, this finite individual reaches beyond itself to a source of perfection which transcends both of these distinctions.³ The dual nature of the finite finds its resolution in the Absolute.⁴

The implication is clear that the Absolute itself is neither good nor bad.⁵ The all-absorbing One, wherein the opposing distinctions are resolved, itself is not to be characterized by terms applicable to the opposing parts. Yet it should be noted that the criterion for the good is the individual, the self-contained whole.⁶ But then, nothing is properly individual or perfect except the Absolute.⁷ By this logic, the Absolute seems to me to become the criterion of good; "good" and "perfect" seem to become synonyms. Only by union of the finite will with the good can the perfection of the finite be attained.⁸ Or, from the other side of the relation, the Real manifests itself truly through its appearances in various degrees of goodness. This is indicated further in the following: "whether anything is better or worse, does without any doubt make a difference to the Absolute. And certainly the better anything is, the less totally in the end is it being overruled."⁹

We have, then, what seems to be the paradoxical situation wherein the Absolute is above good and evil as the Whole and is yet itself the *summum bonum*. While the Absolute is eternally perfect, it is transmuting the imperfect, the ugly, the evil.¹⁰ Since no single aspect by itself alone can have goodness, we must seek beyond for the goodness.¹¹ And all the activities and meanings of the finite beings become subordinate to the good: "Goodness, beauty, and truth are all there is which in the end is real. Their reality appearing amid chance and change is beyond these and is eternal. But, in whatever world they appear, that world so far is real."¹² Then we are told that every other element, truth, etc., is subjugated to the one inclusive category, the good. This would present no especial difficulty, thinks Bradley, if it were not for the erroneous assumption that the Absolute is a moral person.¹³ The sense in which goodness is attributed to our struggling wills, as moral beings overcoming certain lacks and aggressions against our welfare, cannot be attributed to the Absolute which lacks nothing. The sense in which the Absolute is meant as the criterion of goodness

1. *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 238-239.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 416-417.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 411.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 246.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 430.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 488-489; *Essays on Truth and Reality*, pp. 6-7.

11. *Essays on Truth and Reality*, pp. 1-3.

13. *Appearance and Reality*, p. 197.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 401.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 419.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 243 ff.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 441.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 469.

has been suggested just above in the conception of perfection, the inclusive resolution of conflicts, the completeness of individuality.

A reference to Bradley's criticism of goodness as meaning ultimately "inward morality" would be pertinent here: now if it matters what this "inner life," the motive of the will, does, we are carried on beyond the "bare will" to the more inclusive field of reference.¹⁴ In other words, it becomes our moral duty to become non-moral, i.e., super-moral.¹⁵ It is the old story over again of the Real—and the good as an affective-valuative aspect of the Real—being told in terms of wholeness, of the transcendence of fragment, of lack, of contradiction.

So, in the end, Bradley's position on evil is characteristically Absolutistic: evil is a necessary aspect of the "appearances" of our universe; and it is only by abstraction from the Real, the Whole, that evil can have any force. While we cannot comprehend why there should be such persistent appearance and then an eternal Absolute, an ever-present perfection, we are, nevertheless, driven by logical necessity to such a view as Bradley maintains. Bradley reminds one of the religious faith which holds that "all is the perfect expression of a supreme will, and all things therefore are good."¹⁶

All the given world of experience, declares Bosanquet, is reeking with discord: "In truth, the actual world is charged with contradiction."¹⁷ Out of this discord arise our distinctions of good and evil. The nature of good and evil is revealed, not in the content, but in the side assigned to a content in the contradiction of attitudes.¹⁸ For instance, we cannot identify evil with a pleasure-content; for there are pleasures which are evil by reason of their being obstructive to the whole of a life's interests.¹⁹ On the other hand, there are pains which are good by virtue of promoting the vitality of the whole.²⁰ Whatever the good is in its particular content it must have some bearing on satisfaction on the whole.²¹

As finite beings, we are accustomed to considering as good that which satisfies the desires of this unitary self; we demand primarily, not mere pleasure, but satisfaction, the attaining of ourselves in the fullest meaning of ourselves that we can apprehend.²² And in this positive attainment, we often include pain. Personality usually is produced at the cost of pain.²³ In fact, we often esteem as having the strongest personality, the most nearly complete personality, him who has endured and encompassed the most and severest pains. From this it is

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 431 ff.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 440, 453-454.

17. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 227.

18. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 205.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 168-170, 196.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 197.

23. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 244-245.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 436.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 196.

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 192-193.

inferred that though failure may force a recognition of our limitations upon us, "Defect and contradiction cannot constitute the really significant essence even of a finite being."²⁴

Such being, as we have noted before, is a self-transcending creature. But the very need for transcendence marks him as finite. And this implies the naturally inhering possibilities of evil.²⁵ This is to be observed throughout our experience of reaching beyond to a more nearly adequate personality.²⁶ Therefore, finiteness is the condition of evil.²⁷ There can be no significance in evil except for finite minds. The "root of our troubles," says Bosanquet, "is one with the root of our value."²⁸ A being with no sense or set of values could hardly have any experience that could make distinctions of good and evil.²⁹ On the other hand, there would be no sense of values without the experience of pain, of obstruction.³⁰ Now it is true that there can be a "progress" from brute agony to a self-conscious suffering; and this self-conscious suffering can recognize the triumph of its values in the very progressive command over pain that is being developed.

One might understand, then, Bosanquet's statement that the finite self, in its passion for self-transcendence, sets up a hostile system of evil to be overcome.³¹ This is of a piece with Bosanquet's insistence that apart from the finite individual's attitude we hardly could be said to have good or evil.³² We find an analogous situation in the aesthetic realm. Bosanquet says: "ugliness is all of a man's making and not of nature's."³³ We are not surprised to hear Spinoza echoed in the reference to that thinker's designation of evil as having no essence of its own but as being merely a partial perception within the essence of something else.³⁴ By this, Bosanquet does not seem to mean that finiteness and evil are mere illusions.³⁵ Rather, they are real; but real as somehow immanent and modified in Reality as the Whole.

More definitely, we might face the question as to how far evil is a character of the Absolute. Now we have observed that evil can be evil only as it is relative to the good.³⁶ If, then, evil must presuppose the good, and the good is in terms of the satisfying whole of experience, there is nothing in evil which cannot be absorbed into the good and, therefore, into the Absolute.³⁷ This in no way implies a limitation of the Absolute: "The universe may be perfect owing to the very

24. *Ibid.*, p. 250.

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 201-202.

26. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, pp. 169-170.

27. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 350-351.

28. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 176.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 180.

30. *Ibid.*

31. *Ibid.*, p. 210.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 201.

33. *Three Lectures on Aesthetics*, p. 108.

34. *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 86.

35. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 240-241.

36. See *supra*, p. 23.

37. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, pp. 193-194, 197, 217; *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 243, 352.

fact, among others, that it includes, as conditions of finite life, both moral good and evil."³⁸ We are reminded here, by way of an illustrative analogy, of Bosanquet's characterization of the religious consciousness: it holds evil to be absorbed into a whole of which the finite consciousness is a part, a "spiritual member."³⁹ This is further illustrated by the consciousness of sin in a self as co-present with the repudiation of that sin by the self.⁴⁰ Religion presents the perpetual paradox of "treating its finite imperfections as nothing, but not as non-existent."⁴¹ Such a resolution can obtain upon principle according to Bosanquet, for "the ultimate logical structure . . . of suffering and of evil is the same as that of satisfaction and of good."⁴²

Referring to moral evil, Bosanquet says:

The point and meaning of the bad will is wholly lost unless it is a development of the self in the same sense as the good will; the only difference being that it has seized a false clue such as is essentially incapable of doing the work of unification, which the will as such sets out to do, and is thus brought into a more or less explicit antagonism to the purposes of unified life, and ultimately to itself.⁴³

When we recall in connection with this, Bosanquet's principle of individuality as the criterion of reality and the consequent indifference of pleasure and pain as such,⁴⁴ we can understand his optimism. It depends not upon a balance of pleasure over pain; its condition is, instead, the "completeness in which souls have found themselves, or realized their inherent structure."⁴⁵ We live in a universe persistent in distinctions, but whose distinctions need not be immutably contradictory.

The "Principle of Negativity" recognizes distinctions within the complete. "A true negativity, say, an organised universe of desire, is a solved contradiction."⁴⁶ Such a principle inheres in the very nature of our logic, which logic, as we have seen, is the very dynamic of the Real. "This, then, is the nerve of logical determination, viz. the removal of error or contradiction by means of a positive union in which data or premisses destroy each other's defects, and give rise to a new totality which transcends its factors."⁴⁷ Therefore, evil is, on principle, absorbed, integrated into the good, the Real, the Absolute. This answer, thinks Bosanquet, is much more satisfactory than that of Theism; for the insistence upon conceiving God as identified with the finite struggle against evil is contradictory to the postulated perfection of God.⁴⁸

38. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 218.

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 241-242.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 246.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 246; *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 253-254.

42. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 242.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 351.

44. See *supra*, pp. 23-24.

45. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 247.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 232.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 264.

48. *Ibid.*, pp. 248-249.

Royce has declared that Theism could offer no ground for the solution of the problem of evil. This is because of the pluralism espoused by Theism. But first, what is evil? "An evil is, in general, a fact that sends us to some Other for its own justification, and for the satisfaction of our will."⁴⁹ Royce would include as evil the external factors, as he designates them, pain, death, weakness of character, and the internal, such as the bad will itself.⁵⁰ Or he characterizes it as the present temporal defeat of a purpose.

From all this it obviously is inferred that the source of evil is in the nature of finite beings.⁵¹ "*Man can attend*," says Royce, "*to but a very narrow range of facts at any one instant*";⁵² but "Our form of consciousness is one of our chief human sorrows."⁵³ Again, with especial reference to the temporal aspects of the finite, Royce says: "It follows that dissatisfaction is the universal experience of every temporal being."⁵⁴ So evil inheres in the finite, but not in the finite as merely finite, ostracized to his finiteness, if such a conception were possible. Rather, evil obtains because the finite has some capacity to feel its limitations: "For the type of consciousness that we now possess, and any type of temporally limited consciousness, is too narrow for our higher purposes."⁵⁵ We may be fragments, seeing "darkly," but we do see.⁵⁶

This dual reference within us is productive of moral progress, granting progress. And the inseparable corollary of such a nature is the possibility of moral evil.⁵⁷ The very business of living means willing and, consequently, conflict.⁵⁸ This is the very condition of moral consciousness. A moral order can exist—so far as we can conceive—only by conquering evil.⁵⁹ This obtains on any plane which a finite being knows.⁶⁰ To wipe out the possibility of blunders and suffering would mean the preclusion of any freedom or effectiveness of action.⁶¹ How emphatic Royce is on this point, we can judge from his statement concerning the "mission of sorrow": "Let man, the destroyer, then remember that there is one ill which he could not destroy, even if he were God, without also destroying all the spiritual prowess in which all those rejoice, who, inspired by an ambition infinitely above that of Achilles, long to be one with God through bearing and overcoming the sorrows of a world."⁶² It is impossible, then, for

49. *The World and the Individual*, II, 363, 380.

50. *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, pp. 454-455.

51. *The World and the Individual*, I, 376 ff.

52. *Sources of Religious Insight*, p. 259.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 262.

54. *The World and the Individual*, II, 381-382.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 383; *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, pp. 371-375.

56. *Studies of Good and Evil*, p. 27.

57. *The World and the Individual*, II, 389-390.

58. *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, pp. 454-455.

59. *Ibid.*, p. 461; *The World and the Individual*, II, 385 ff.

60. *Studies of Good and Evil*, p. 106.

61. *Sources of Religious Insight*, p. 251; *Studies of Good and Evil*, pp. 98 ff.

62. *Sources of Religious Insight*, pp. 253-254.

us to know a higher good than that arising from the subordination of evil to good in a "total experience."⁶³

The question now is, how there can be evil in an Absolute Good. Unequivocally, Royce says:

I hold that all finite consciousness, *just as it is in us*,—ignorance, striving, defeat, error, temporality, narrowness,—*is all present from the Absolute point of view, but is also seen in unity with the solution of problems, the attainment of goals, the overcoming of defeats, the correction of errors, the final wholeness of temporal processes, the supplementing of all narrowness.*⁶⁴

We have noted that the finite consciousness could struggle and aspire, because it had some kind of sight or hold on a higher, more inclusive existence as being possible for it. In fact, Royce insists that we cannot desire anything better unless that something better already exists somehow, unless in a sense we already are in "possession of" it.⁶⁵

Yet such experience we do not grasp with any absoluteness. Therefore, there must be an Infinite as the absolute condition of the good which haunts and inspires us, yet often eludes us. This argument employs practically the same principle as was used in the problem of error: error is possible as such only by reference to a more inclusive experience; and since there are infinite possibilities for error, there must be Inclusive Thought as the ground for the detection and resolution of the error.⁶⁶

So evil can be evil only as it is a conquered tendency in the Whole.⁶⁷ On the other hand, the perfection that we demand can have no intelligibility for us if it does not embrace the finite imperfections and consequent struggles through which we gain our sense of higher values. Royce has said: ". . . unless God knows sorrow, he knows not the highest good, which consists in the overcoming of sorrow."⁶⁸

In the main, our Absolutists agree in their positions on evil. The chief point of agreement is that evil is inherent in the finite existence and thus shares the fate of all finite existence, that is, ultimate unreality. The Real, according to Bradley's emphasis, is above the distinctions of good and evil; and evil, therefore, is an abstraction from the Whole. The good is involved, however, as the intrinsic value of individuality, which is the criterion of reality.⁶⁹ Bosanquet further characterizes evil as that which obstructs the attainment of wholeness.⁷⁰

63. *Studies of Good and Evil*, p. 24.

64. *The World and the Individual*, II, 302.

65. *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 445.

66. *Ibid.*, pp. 396 ff., 425 ff.

67. *Ibid.*, pp. 452 ff.; *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, pp. 470-471.

68. *The World and the Individual*, II, 410; *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, pp. 439-440; *Studies of Good and Evil*, p. 14.

69. See *supra*, pp. 22, 24, 26.

70. See *supra*, pp. 24 ff.

This is not to be identified with any especial content or peculiarity of organization; it is, rather, the attitude which permits any content or organization to be obstructive to the realization of individuality. The good, for us, is the satisfactory Whole, as Bradley also has suggested. This also is not to be identified with any given content; it might, as a matter of fact, include much pain. The good, the Whole, is such by reason of the resolution of all obstructions into a satisfactory unity. Bosanquet's principle of "Negativity" has represented admirably this position. The very perfection of the Whole is evident through its inclusive resolution of contradictions into a recognized diversity which is nevertheless satisfactorily unified. Royce is in essential agreement with Bosanquet's recognition of diversity within the Absolute as evidence of its perfection.⁷¹ Evil, stated in the characteristic terms of Royce, is the defeat of present purposes. But for these evils to be identified as such, they must be included within the Absolute.

To return to the fundamental point of agreement, evil is considered by our Absolutists in general as a necessary accompaniment of the moral consciousness. So far, this is in accord with my Humanistic doctrine. The consequent question for me is: if evil is a necessary accompaniment of the moral consciousness, then will not evil be correspondingly as ultimate as the moral consciousness? Now, if there is any cogency to my arguments on time, one must admit the primacy of the moral consciousness.

We have seen that Bradley classified goodness as the supreme category for us.⁷² We have indicated that our world is unintelligible to us except through the postulates of the moral consciousness. Therefore, goodness is not goodness in general or in the abstract. I take quite seriously Bosanquet's suggestion that good and evil are dependent upon the attitude of the finite individual.⁷³ I disclaim here any intention of involving myself in the idealistic-realistic issue. Instead, I am concerned with indicating that, since the primary unit of intelligibility is for us the moral consciousness, whatever is an ineradicable factor of that moral consciousness is to be accepted as essentially ultimate.⁷⁴ Though the evil may be redeemed in our later experience, the fact remains that it is persistent in its identity as that imperfection.

Now as I have intimated just above, I can agree with Bosanquet's position that evil is not of essentially different stuff, content, or organization. He has said, for instance, in his characterization of the "bad will" that it is "a development of the self in the same sense as the good will"; the difference, continues Bosanquet, "being that it has seized a false clue such as is essentially incapable of doing the work of unification, which the will as such sets out to do, and is thus brought into a more or less explicit antagonism to the purpose of unified life, and ultimately to itself."⁷⁵ We do not need to explain evil by any source, any

71. See *supra*, pp. 24-25, 26.

72. *Essays on Truth and Reality*, pp. 1-3.

73. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 201.

74. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 242.

75. *Ibid.*, pp. 351-352.

material or psychological equipment different from those usually intelligible to us. I maintain that this supports my Humanistic contentions. The distinctions of good and evil arise from the finite mind's point of view, which view is determined by the mind's values. I further insist that it does not follow from this that we must set up a sort of dualism wherein we postulate over against the imperfect finite mind the Absolute mind. I think the Absolutists have been guilty of such a dualism despite their attempts to keep all within the one. Therefore, I further insist that we have our world before us as events of experience. In themselves—if such a situation can be assumed for the sake of the argument—these events might be indifferent. They are good or bad according to the interests, the needs, the purposes of the individuals.

This need not mean a purely individualistic relativism. For the similarity of the constitutions of the individuals and of their experiences, as I have been insisting all along, will result in generally accepted criteria. The essential point is that these events must be ultimately good or evil with reference to the needs or interests that determined them to be evil or good. And it has been contended staunchly that the interests and needs of us individuals are the fundamental indications of reality. We might agree with Bosanquet that states of consciousness have their significance only as the integrated expressions of an individual.⁷⁶

I hasten to add, however, that this unitary self of ours is known only in those interests and needs which determine the good or evil of an event. That self cannot be what it is independently of its experiences by any sort of abstraction from them. These experiences of good and evil are ineradicable elements in that self. A given evil might be conquered. The fact remains that it was irrevocably that evil. In fact, there would be no meaning for the individual in saying that he had conquered an evil if the evil did not maintain its identity as the evil that had been conquered. Its classification on some other principle of division might have been changed, but it is that evil still.

I find corroboration of this in Royce's discussion of "atonement."⁷⁷ The deed stands done: "Penalty, even if called for, annuls nothing of all that has been done."⁷⁸ More than that, a new deed must be entered for the conquest, the atonement. I am not concerned just now with the optimism expressed in the following passage, but rather with the idea of the necessity of the new deed. "*No baseness or cruelty of treason so deep or so tragic shall enter our human world, but that loyal love shall be able in due time to oppose to just that deed of treason its fitting deed of atonement.*"⁷⁹ The old deed does not lose its identity; the conquest of it is by a totally new deed.

To this argument from the irrevocable identity of the evil deed I wish to add the related point that there is no transcendence of evil in the abstract. If we transcend an evil, we do it through a further production of events. In our

76. *Ibid.*, pp. 307 ff.

78. *Ibid.*, p. 302.

77. *The Problem of Christianity*, I, Lecture VI.

79. *Ibid.*, p. 322.

weariness we sometimes long for a resolution of all of our conflicts in a cessation of willing and acting. But such a state could have no significance at all for us. We at least should require sufficient vitality of understanding to contrast our Nirvana with the state of our previous conflicts. That could not mean an actual cessation. In short, then, the only transcendence of evil we can know is through continued experiences.

These continued experiences, as I have insisted above, cannot obliterate the evil. They simply place it in a wider setting. To make explicit another implication of my position, inasmuch as evil is conquered only through continued experience, we have the continued possibilities of evil always with us. For it must be recalled that we have denied any dualism in experience or in the experiencing mind which would go about this continued and transcending experience with a different set of equipment. Then it must be further recalled that this very continuity and relative progression in experience are the conditions of our values. Conversely, the values continue to condition the experiences, calling for the progressive maintenance of those values. Therefore, I conclude, we can conceive no existence at all intelligible to us which is not involved in the possibilities of evil.

Evil is an eternally present possibility. For instance, no matter how good a man might be morally, on the plane of his eminence he has his "trials and tribulations." As Royce has said, the moral man must struggle on his higher plane as earnestly as ever the pathological man must on his.⁸⁰ Or again, giving the evidence a slightly different turn, we aim at making virtue habitual, and therefore obviating the necessity of continued conflict of impulses or choices. Even though one becomes thus habituated in one virtue or in many, it does not mean that he is habituated completely in all virtue. Aside from the question of whether a man is truly virtuous if he is thus habituated, we have the fact that every man is so constituted that he either must lose his sense of values or else continue with some experiences of comparisons, perhaps even of conflicts.

Here must be emphasized a related point: one's values are in direct proportion to the progressively comprehensive struggles and conquests in his experiences. Bosanquet has said that evil is involved in the very nature of finite beings' completing themselves.⁸¹ But my point is that they never complete themselves. Again, Royce has declared "Loyalty" and adversity to be inseparable companions.⁸² And "Loyalty," we understand from Royce, is a fundamental value, as well as a need, and should be maintained. The world, being as it is, is giving rise to needs, continually is producing the conditions of adversity and therefore of "Loyalty."

It might be objected here against my position that a man might become so developed in mind that his understanding would become comprehensively

80. *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, pp. 454-455; *Studies of Good and Evil*, p. 106.

81. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 242.

82. *Sources of Religious Insight*, p. 253.

aware of the world's meaning and that, therefore, he would be less subject to conflicts. Such ease—and I find support in Royce—such ease is a contradiction of experience: "The more the world means, at any moment, to our consciousness, the more we go on towards some goal."⁸³ This is further substantiated by Bosanquet's "Principle of Negativity": the true self is not the exclusive being who has closed himself against the vast diversity of the universe; rather it is he who widens his own comprehension and yet by so doing pushes the boundaries and goals of knowledge and ideals always before him.⁸⁴ In other words, the more we exercise the fundamental nature of ourselves as conscious beings, the more we are stimulated by the alluring diversity with its comparisons, contrasts, and conflicts, opening before us.

Thus far my argument has been confined largely to the nature of the moral consciousness itself and to its implications. I have pointed out that the nature of that consciousness is essentially and inescapably involved in processes of experience which necessitate the actuality of evil *ad indefinitum*. The question might now be raised as to the *nisus* toward a completion of ourselves: is there offered no answer to the longing of the finite to be complete? Is there not a genuine Absolute into which all the ceaseless rounds of evil can be absorbed? My immediate response to this question is another question: just what can we mean when we talk of an Absolute which can absorb our imperfect experiences? Or what kind of an experience should this absorption be? In other words, in what sense can any of this be intelligible to us? An Absolute which performed this absorption in a manner wholly unintelligible to us could hardly assure that the absorption was accomplished.

I have stated above my objections to any dualism wherein the Infinite stood in its perfection over against the finite.⁸⁵ And whenever the Absolute partakes of this abstraction, it is in no better position than the God who moves in utterly mysterious and capricious ways his "wonders to perform." The purely arbitrary "grace of God," for instance, gives us no reliable basis for the answer to our problem of evil. Now I am quite willing to admit that we might find no ultimate answer to the problem. I do contend, however, that we should avoid so far as possible, leaping *ad ignorantiam*. Accordingly, following Bosanquet's advice, let us examine the nature of the highest experiences we know. Goodness, beauty, and truth Bradley declares to be the highest types of experiences and the experiences most fully indicative of reality.⁸⁶

What do these experiences mean? Truth is not an abstractly transcendent eternal entity, absorbing all degrees and distinctions. Rather, truth is the reconciliation of judgment and reality won in our experience. And the truth of a judgment is appreciated as such by virtue of its distinction from its object, which

83. *The World and the Individual*, II, 407.

84. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 232 ff.

85. See *supra*, pp. 29, 30.

86. *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 469.

distinction is impressed upon us by the experience of winning the reconciliation. The experience of beauty is not an undifferentiated immediacy.⁸⁷ The equilibrium of strains which might obtain psychologically does not signify a loss of distinctions or the absence of previous effort. As a matter of fact, those aesthetic experiences which often are considered the most profoundly satisfying are the sublime and the tragic. In these experiences, then, mind must go beyond any mere immediacy to a comprehension of vastness, grandeur, or mystery, as in the sublime; or it must encompass in one span of appreciation the values of human life and the overwhelming concentration of circumstances that defeats the heroic champions of those values.

As for goodness, we are now involved in an attempt to understand it. More or less formal definitions we have had: such as, the highest satisfaction on the whole.⁸⁸ This presupposes all the Absolutistic emphasis on non-contradiction and individuality as criteria for truth and reality. But the question still persists: just what is the nature of this goodness? Does it have any significance beyond our experiences? Or, in other words, what kind of highest, most inclusive, most satisfying experience is intelligible to us? Royce offers an answer: it is impossible to know a higher good than that which comes from the subordination of evil to good in a total experience, or, as he puts it otherwise, good is nothing if not the "good fight."⁸⁹ Bosanquet, we have seen, admits pain as a vital and ineradicable element in the good.⁹⁰ The highest realization of will which we know is that attained through pain and conflict; pain and evil are constituents in the highest experience.

These views are after the analogy of the survival of desire in satisfaction. We hardly should say we were satisfied if we had lost all awareness of the desire that sought satisfaction. There can be no satisfaction in abstraction. Now, inasmuch as evil, physical and moral, is vitally obstructive in our lives, naturally we intensely desire the resolution of those evils. Then the satisfactions of those desires will be in proportion to the intensity of the desires. This can account psychologically for the supreme place given in our lives to the experiences of subordinating the evil to the good, of the resolution of the contradictions and obstructions. Again, I employ the analogy of the "fortune of love": the experience of love, wherever it is genuine and sturdy enough to survive, is all the more meaningful when it has survived a tragedy.⁹¹ As a further illustration of this point, I refer again to Royce's "religious mission of sorrow": "Let man, the destroyer, then remember that there is one ill which he could not destroy even if he were God, without also destroying all the spiritual prowess in which all those rejoice who, inspired by an ambition infinitely above that of Achilles, long to be one with

87. *The Spirit and Substance of Art*, especially pp. 61ff.

88. See *supra*, pp. 22, 23, 25, 27.

89. *Studies of Good and Evil*, pp. 24, 86.

90. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 277.

91. *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, p. 447.

od through bearing and overcoming the sorrows of a world."⁹² By way of summary, I quote another significant passage from Royce: "Were there then no longing in Time, there would be no peace in Eternity."⁹³ So the highest kind of experience we know contains as an essential part of its vitality, evil. Wherever the highest, most satisfying experiences obtain for us, evil must be there unmistakably as that evil which was involved in our struggling through to this good, though it is now resolved into an intelligible place in the Whole.

The analysis of the so-called highest experiences given just above should indicate my answer to the question of the significance any transcendence or absorption into the Absolute could have for us. That I might not seem, however, to dismiss the question too summarily, I now turn to a more direct and explicit consideration of whether there can be any transcendence into an Absolute or absorption into it which can obtain in any way other than that of our own experience as I have characterized it above. Royce has said:

hold that all finite consciousness, *just as it is in us*,—ignorance, striving, defeat, error, temporality, narrowness,—*is all present from the Absolute point of view, but is also in its unity with the solution of problems, the attainment of goals, the overcoming of defeats, the correction of errors, the final wholeness of temporal processes, the superseding of all narrowness.*⁹⁴

Bosanquet also extends the application of our most highly valued experiences to the cosmos: "The universe may be perfect owing to the very fact, among others, that it includes, as conditions of finite life, both moral good and evil."⁹⁵ Royce's picture of the divine and his time-span reveals a unitive consciousness which simply sees all at once in the series.⁹⁶ Bradley agrees in the main with these characterizations of the transmutation of evil in the Absolute. He would impress upon us, though, his insistence that the ugly and the evil are no longer present in the Absolute as ugly or evil.⁹⁷

These citations I offer as substantiating in the main my contention that the transmutation which is claimed for the Absolute can be intelligible in no terms other than our own experience of transmutation. Bradley's position is not quite in accord with the statements of Bosanquet and Royce so far as recognition of evil experiences in the Absolute is concerned. I persistently repeat, by way of critical comment upon these passages, and especially upon Bradley's, that an experience in which the evils involved no longer have any continuity and, therefore, identity with their former nature is wholly unintelligible. I do not forget that evil is not to be identified with any given content; and so I admit that a content might be taken up into an Absolute Experience, granting such for the

92. *Sources of Religious Insight*, pp. 253-254; *The World and the Individual*, II, 408-410.

93. *The World and the Individual*, II, 386.

94. *Ibid.*, p. 302.

95. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 218.

96. *The World and the Individual*, II, 115-118, 143-147, 418, 420.

97. *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 488-489.

moment, and that the fact of its presence there would not necessarily imply the presence of it as evil, just because that content had been associated as an evil in a former and finite experience.

I contend, however, that this absorption can have no meaning for us otherwise than as a reshaping, usually by a broader inclusion, of experiences and a consequent resetting of those experiences which were obstructive. So, I admit, there is no longer that obstruction as obstructing. But there is present that experience as having been that obstruction. Bradley himself admits that: "whether anything is better or worse, does without any doubt make a difference to the Absolute. And certainly the better anything is, the less totally in the end is its being over-ruled."⁹⁸ I hold, then, that Bosanquet's and Royce's recognition of the evil as present in the Absolute, though it be supplemented and modified in whatever ways necessary, and Bradley's admission of the degrees of "better or worse" of anything as making a difference to the Absolute attest the inescapable principle of our own experience as obtaining even for the Absolute. I repeat, further, that the "over-ruling" of which Bradley speaks can have for us no meaning if it means a loss of continuity with that which is being over-ruled. Royce frankly admits that this characterization of the Absolute is after the analogy of our own experience: in the midst of fighting evil, we are aware of the "divine spark."⁹⁹

To bring my point to a head: the Absolute has no significance beyond our need to postulate as a possibility an experience in which obstructions can be overcome on a larger scale than they seem to be in our limited experiences. We constantly strive to enlarge our experience so as to reset the obstructing experiences. We are satisfied according to the degrees of our success. But our successes are not always as complete as we should like them to be; in many cases they are only provisional. Yet there is the urgent desire for complete success. From this basis we postulate an Absolute Experience in which we hope will be consummated our failures. So we desire of our Absolute resolutions or absorptions of evil according to the models of our own experiences. I take this as valid ground for my contention that at heart the Absolute is a Humanistic product whose creators have forgotten its origin and have remembered only the expanse between our expectations of it and our own indifferent success. Therefore, I claim, there is nothing in the Absolutistic position which consistently can obviate the Humanistic view of evil.

Royce has charged that pluralism can have no solution for the problem of evil.¹⁰⁰ In response, I contend that the existence of evil is much more intelligible to us on pluralistic than on monistic grounds. With reference to error—and I see no difference in principle from that involved in evil—Bosanquet says: "The reservoir of possible error, then, so to speak, is that of facts whose conditions

98. *Ibid.*, p. 430.

100. See *supra*, p. 26.

99. *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 452.

are partially or very slightly known, the storehouse of possible alternatives."¹⁰¹ The "possible alternatives" as conditions of error, I take to be essentially like the alternatives of a "loose-jointed universe" upon which my Humanism has been insisting. It is much more plausible to admit evil into a pluralistic world than into a monistic one; for the monistic world presents itself, according to our Absolutists, as the Whole of Reality and, by virtue of being that Whole, as Perfect. But the recognition of the full value of struggle and possible evil for the moral consciousness and of the necessity for continuity of the evil in even the transmuting Absolute seems to me incompatible with the idea of an Absolute Perfection given once and for all.

Then if we accept the suggestion of Bosanquet that evil is not identified with any given content as such, but with the obstructing attitude—which is not necessarily intentionally obstructive—is it not more reasonable to postulate a pluralistic world wherein the plurality of alternatives will provide the possibility of erroneous choices and adjustments? In the following quotation from Bosanquet, I interpret an admission of just such indetermination and risk:

What we can will is reacted upon by what we can do. This is why in the beginning we do not know how to will the good, and have to learn it with pain and labor, by forming habits adequate in detail to its content as the concrete unity of our world.¹⁰²

If it were given once and for all in the Absolute and we were necessary parts of that Absolute, why should all this labor and pain be necessary? Why should there be any learning processes at all?

Now the Absolutist admits that he has no answer for the question as to why there are diversity and evil in the world. His concern is, accepting the existence of what we call evil, to understand how best the evil can be placed and resolved. He might go on to comment on Bosanquet's text that this pain and labor of learning the good presupposes some awareness of the "Concrete unity of our world"; therefore, we in our comparative impotence, on the one hand, feel the impress of the Whole, on the other. To this I might rejoin that, beyond the persistent formal judgment which employs "the world" as the subject, the "concrete unity" of the world is for us a fluctuating quantity. Often we may find that an inadequate "concrete unity" held by us was the cause of our maladjustment. The Absolutists might remind us that this fluctuation expresses the Absolutists' degrees of truth and reality. I respond that I cannot understand why the Absolute should have to reveal itself in such a piece-meal method. So again we run into an unintelligibility which leaves unexplained a vital experience. Therefore, I come back to my pluralistic universe as the ground of such shifting.

Some one asks if this means a pessimism. The answer is, not necessarily. Our Absolutists have admitted the vital activity of evil. Yet they offer comfort.

101. "Life and Philosophy," *Contemporary British Philosophy*, First Series, p. 67.

102. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 201.

Royce has offered it in the enjoined recognition of eternal significance of the finite and of the assurance of God's fulfilment through our suffering.¹⁰³ Both of these items of comfort I hold to be compatible with my Humanistic position. The second item is established purely by analogy from our own experiences. At some length I have tried to emphasize the fact that any other basis for the assumption means nothing to us. The first need mean no more than that the finite being, as he is in the full significance of his own powers, is the ultimate instrument of his own salvation; i.e., rather than postulating a sort of dualism within the creature himself, as between his essentially finite being and the infinite immanent in him, that we should recognize all his capacities as essentially his own. Therefore, rather than to surrender to his impotence, he should rise to the challenge of his own ascendant capacities with which he enlarges the grasp of his life to overcome obstructions.

In conclusion, I quote for support from Bosanquet:

But all this granted, still, so far as the finite being lives a life at all, it affirms in its whole existence the principle of the Absolute. It transmutes toil into happiness by seeing it as a pledge of devotion, and pain into love by the depth of the tenderness it evokes, and hardship into courage by revelation of what a man is able to be.¹⁰⁴

But why suggest an Absolute that is over against or above us since we, so far as we live "a life at all," are doing these very things? We are the only Absolute that is known. And if, in the pain and labor and failures of our lives, we still feel a dependence on a "Beyond," the very vitality of these pains and failures will direct us toward a Theistic God rather than toward a completely perfect Absolute.

103. *The World and the Individual*, II, 407-408.

104. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 377.

III FREEDOM

IN the problem of freedom, we have the culminating question of the relation of the individual to his world. In the time process we have given the formal conditions of our experience and values. In the distinctions of good and evil we have the qualitative conditions of our content of values. But in the possibility of freedom we have the basic condition of being moral selves at all; for if we are not to some degree self-determining, we hardly can be said to produce any good for ourselves or our fellows. In fact, if we are determined beings, goods or values can have no significance whatever for us.

A brief restatement of the Humanistic position on the freedom of the "will" further emphasizes this point. The Humanist bases his arguments for freedom almost exclusively upon the ground of the moral consciousness. The position, in a word, is an insistence upon the ultimate reality of alternatives for us. Such a reality of alternatives clearly implies the existence of minds that can be aware of them as alternatives; and if they are truly alternatives, minds have the possibilities of choices among them. This argument can stand independently of the ontological question about mind.

The Humanist protests against determinism on both scientific and ethical grounds. The uniform and rigid laws of nature are, after all, the products of a moral demand for regularity and predictability. There is in the postulation of these natural laws no valid ground for the absolute exclusion of the possibility of chance. By chance, the Humanist means no positively disruptive force. Chance simply means "loose-jointed" connections inexplicable in terms of the laws we have deduced from our experienced world.

If we lived a thoroughly determined existence, we should have a perfectly irrational experience in our regretting what we considered moral errors, for instance, and, further, in our desiring to correct and improve our conduct. If determinism be admitted in the face of our ineradicable experiences of regret and moral striving, we have no recourse other than pessimism. As a rational escape from the pessimism of determinism, we are offered by Humanism an indeterminism which will do justice to the vital assumptions of the moral consciousness: i.e., our uncertainties, our regrets, our strivings for the good.

Now the evidences of our freedom are not of a direct nature. Psychologically, we experience the feeling of choosing; but it is not at all certain that this feeling is substantiated metaphysically. Humanism, however, offers the indirect evidences of the plasticity of habits as analogous to the plasticity we experience in nature. In both cases, in our own habit modifications and in our adjustments to changing environment, we give evidences of a power of control in ourselves.

This freedom and power are limited, it is true; but they are not the less vital in our experience.

While I have indicated in general the positions of the Absolutists on the problem of freedom, there is need to set forth a more explicit outline of those positions.

In Bradley I find the least entertainment of the theme of freedom. "My real personal self which orders my world is in truth inseparably one with the Universe,"¹ he says. This position he has stated even more emphatically:

And the independent reality of the individual, when we examine it, is in truth mere illusion. Apart from the community, what are separate men? It is the common mind within him which gives reality to the human being, and taken by himself, whatever else he is, he is not human.²

Obviously, Bradley does not mean to deny some kind of awareness and activity concentrated within centers that we call selves. In fact, he says: "The real individual is in short 'that sphere which his activity doth fill.'"³ Again he says: "We must treat the individual as real so far as anywhere for any purpose his being is appreciable."⁴ It seems that we are bound—though why we cannot say—to the diversified and shifting "appearances" of the reality through these finite centers. It is within, and only within, the realm of the "appearances" that our categories of willing and striving apply.⁵

In this restricted sense, we can think of the realization of the ends of the self. The will might create in the practical attitude of the individual; but it can create only finitely.⁶ Bradley, of course, meant this to have no ultimacy. Therefore, in no ultimate sense does Bradley admit our categories of will and freedom. And he designates chance as that which is outside any system of reality.⁷ "Chance," he says, "belongs to the world of existence and possibility to thought."⁸ So chance is merely a relative character of the world as experienced in the contingencies of space and time. The possibilities of chance are constructed simply within the realm of thought. And we have it impressed sufficiently upon us that Bradley does not consider the world of thought to be representative of the self-contained, complete reality.⁹

Bosanquet repudiates fatalism. Fatalism is for Bosanquet a term inclusive of deterministic doctrines in general. To him fatalism is in opposition to logic and love; it sets forth a world of external moments after the analogy of the physical world.¹⁰ Bosanquet then draws a distinction between determinism and determinateness: all externality of processes which set the causes of events for us is in-

1. *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 218.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 423.

5. *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 413-416.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 387.

9. See *supra*, pp. 6, 7, 21-22, 33, 38.

10. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 340-341.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 434.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 427.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 462-463.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 393.

flexibly deterministic; but it is indeterminate in that its significance has not been logically comprehended within the concrete experience of an individual. Bosanquet's conclusion is that there may be necessary acts required of an agent for conformity to the processes of nature, but that there is no necessary agent; for all of the past and all of the external that is relevant is made into the agent himself.¹¹

Succinctly, Bosanquet sums up his doctrine of freedom in the following words:

It seemed plain throughout that the basis and character of freedom lay not in simple initiations but in an equipment capable of embodying extraordinarily delicate responses to extraordinarily varied environments, and that it is on capacities of such a nature that the possibility of self-realization in the universe was and essentially must be founded.¹²

As Bosanquet has said of moral self-determinism, it consists in "being equal to the situation."¹³ "Being equal to the situation" does not involve any capricious rebellion against one's continuity with the natural processes of his universe. Rather,

Freedom lies in the direction towards unity and coherence; and all that becomes one with the self is capable of contributing (even through apparent contradiction and the effort which it stimulates) to this satisfaction of the inherent logical tendency.¹⁴

Our freedom is commensurate with the degree that we encompass in a consistent whole our responses to our world and thus leave outside nothing relevant and include nothing contradictory to our life-meaning.

"Mind, we repeat, is best regarded as a cosmos, and as working out its behavior by the logic of a cosmos."¹⁵ So our freedom is set in the possibility of living up to our inherent nature as microcosms, cast in the mould of the real, to be centers giving determinateness to the complexes of the world. "The best way to think of the finite individual is to bear in mind the nature of a work of art, or of the moral temper . . . , or of an organic being as the continual source of adaptation by fine adjustments of extreme determinateness and precision."¹⁶ So, in other words, our freedom consists in our ability to manifest the principle of getting hold of our world in wholes, which achievement resolves obstructions and contradictions. We are in essence, then, all the more obviously microcosms; and the extent of our freedom is according to our power of inclusiveness in willing the universal.

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 354-355.

12. "Life and Philosophy," *Contemporary British Philosophy*, First Series, p. 68; *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 105.

13. "Life and Philosophy," *Contemporary British Philosophy*, p. 69.

14. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 326, 354-355.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 323.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 120-121.

From this, it is fairly obvious that Bosanquet does not recognize as freedom any repudiation of law and continuity. He objects to indeterminism on this ground. The denial of continuity amounts to a shrinking from responsibility for one's actions, to the avoidance of committing one's self to his actions.¹⁷ Further, any individualistic system makes the relations of the individuals external. This means that the individual is involved in an external dependence upon other individuals for the satisfaction of his claims; a "world of claims and counter-claims,"¹⁸ Bosanquet calls it. In this sense, then, of contraposing the self against the world and other selves outside of it, there is no freedom.¹⁹

This is one of the counts on which Bosanquet rejects Theism: the separation of the selves from the Supreme Self simply sets them over against each other; and for his realization, each self depends upon the will of at least the Supreme Self and not upon its own nature. There is no freedom, Bosanquet declares, unless the "divine will" is genuinely one with that of the finite beings in a single personality. "A man is free—we now restrict the expression—in so far as he wills the universal object."²⁰ For, and this is the essence of his position, only what is universal is free from self-contradiction, and only that which is free from self-contradiction can be willed without obstruction.

Therefore, we are free to fulfil our destiny only as such manifestations of reality. Each concrete self then "affirms itself as a part of the eternal deed in which the Absolute sustains its living whole of experience."²¹ Perhaps I should not have said that we fulfil our destiny only as manifestations of the real. For Bosanquet would protest: "What we are here offered is a share in the eternal deed which constitutes reality; and I am unable to see what more than this our largest wishes can demand."²² In other words, we surrender our finite self-hood as such into a world of "spiritual membership"; and in this surrender we realize our true selves.²³

"Man can attend to but a very narrow range of facts at any one instant."²⁴

This form of consciousness is "one of our chief human sorrows," affirms Royce.²⁵ Because of it we feel blocked, hemmed-in, determined. Yet we always are rebelling against this limitation.²⁶ It is one thing to rebel, however; it is quite another thing to prove that the rebellion counts for anything. In other words, does our rebellion point toward an actual freedom? First of all, one must face the world of uniform law, of rigid causation. How can there be freedom for the finite individual in such a world?

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 342-343.

18. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, pp. 144-146.

19. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 318.

20. "Symposium," p. 498.

21. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 326.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 335.

23. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 226.

24. *Sources of Religious Insight*, p. 259.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 262.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 261.

There is no denying that the self, from an external point of view, is determined causally and related so within any series of events involving him. From this point of view, therefore, admits Royce, there is no freedom for us.²⁷ But, he declares, this does not explain the "primary character" of the self. Causation is too much of an external concept to account for my conscious life. The meaning of my life is far from being exhausted for me by the category of causation.²⁸ So far as that is concerned, causation is too narrow a category to characterize God's life as it is expressed in his physical world.²⁹ Royce then offers a more fundamental and more exhaustive category, the conscious fulfilment of meaning.³⁰ Just as the body is a very imperfect translation of the mind into the describable language of space, to the physical world, the "World of Description," is an imperfect revelation in "outer aspect" of a deep, spiritual unity of will and plan in the world. "What you want, however, for your Self, is conscious meaning, conscious individuality, and conscious freedom."³¹ Thus, as within a "World of Appreciation," we become aware of ourselves as having "eternal meanings," that is, meanings which transcend the causal determinism of our world.³²

We still have, in a consideration of Royce's doctrine of freedom, and to use his own words, the question "whether such freedom is sufficient to give finite acts their needed character as a choice between what ought to be done, and what ought not to be done, by the individual agent at any moment."³³ It must be admitted that while we might employ the natural laws as means for attaining the fulfilment of our desires, we cannot escape the limits that natural law sets upon us in the possible realization of those desires. Royce's conclusion is that the only true individualism for us consists in the realm of moral autonomy.³⁴ "The only way to be practically autonomous is to be freely loyal," declares Royce.³⁵ In our loyalty to a cause we expansively submit ourselves; and, reciprocally, that submission yields us a sense of a greater autonomy. Only thus do we prove to be more than creatures of a day.

By the exercise of our wills, we no longer merely accept nature; we interpret nature. We see in the processes of nature opportunities and media for the expression of the moral significance of our lives. And our interpretations become quite creative, Royce thinks.³⁶ We construct our causes even though they be made of the ingredients we must accept from our given world. For instance, in referring to the Christian Community, Royce says, "'Since you cannot *find* the universal and beloved community,—*create* it.'"³⁷ It is, after all, the creation

27. *The World and the Individual*, II, 323-325.

28. *Ibid.*, I, 444.

30. *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, p. 419.

31. *The World and the Individual*, II, 291.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 322.

34. *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, p. 77.

36. *The Problem of Christianity*, II, 418.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 445.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 353.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 95.

37. *Ibid.*, I, 359.

of our wills that constitutes for us our real lives;³⁸ the whole ethical meaning of our lives can be summed up in the creations we make of what we find in life.³⁹

Throughout this discussion of Royce's doctrine of freedom, it has been intimated that our freedom cannot be any merely capricious exercise of our wills. We are, in fact, in need of an "ideal purpose," a "total order," to which we can be true or false.⁴⁰ "Loyalty," which Royce has declared the essence of life's conduct and meaning, he defines as "*the Will to Believe in something eternal, and to express that belief in the practical life of a human being.*"⁴¹ Royce has further stated his central principle concisely in the following words: "For us the Self has indeed no Independent Being; but it is a life, and not a mere valid law. It gains its very individuality through its relation to God; but in God it still dwells as an individual; for it is an unique expression of the divine purpose."⁴² If the expression of our lives is to be at all satisfactory, it must be in accord with the Real; and "The essence of the Real is to be Individual."⁴³

For Royce, individuality is explicable in terms of the "unique fulfilment of purpose." Therefore, the true expression of our wills is in accord with the One Individual, the Absolute; for there is no other that is a complete individual, a wholly determinate purpose.⁴⁴ Our purpose consists, then, in finding for ourselves our own place in God's world and in filling that place as nobody else can fill it.⁴⁵ We are, in other words, unique parts in the unique world-plan. The Absolute, the world-plan or whatever we should call it, being the all-inclusive whole, is, of course, unique. Since the very uniqueness of the whole makes it free, being undetermined by anything other than its own essential nature, we, as essential parts of that unique Whole are free.⁴⁶ "You are in God; but you are not lost in God,"⁴⁷ says Royce of the individual. More than that, the Whole, being the Unique Individual, is fulfilled precisely in all of us finite selves: "The divine act whereby God wills your individuality to be what in purpose and meaning it is, is identical with your own individual will, and exists not except as thus identical."⁴⁸

Some of Royce's readers are still in a quandary as to how we are truly free. Does not the Absolute determine us? And if our freedom consists in being just these unique centers within the Whole which has so determined us, are we in any vital sense free? Royce answers this persistent question in his treatment of moral freedom.⁴⁹ To begin, every act of ours is a case of attention. Attention involves both knowledge and volition. By virtue of an idea's getting possession

38. *Ibid.*, II, 293-294.

39. *Ibid.*, I, 350.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 246; *Sources of Religious Insight*, pp. 188-189.

41. *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, p. 357.

42. *The World and the Individual*, II, 286.

43. *Ibid.*, I, 348.

44. *Ibid.*, II, 357-358.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 294.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 346; *Sources of Religious Insight*, pp. 188-189.

47. *The World and the Individual*, I, 465.

48. *Ibid.*, II, 327; I, 449.

49. *Ibid.*, especially pp. 355-360.

of the field of consciousness, it results in action. According to knowledge given in the present, so will our purpose be, and according to the purpose will the "outer deed" be. Given the knowledge, the purpose and action already are implicitly given. If any capricious will could intervene between the idea with its purpose and the fulfilment of the purpose, neither the original idea nor the new intervention could be intelligible. There must be a reliable continuity. "The only field of choice, in such a case, is therefore *the field of attention*," concludes Royce.⁵⁰ One cannot choose anything outside the Absolute. But he can choose to narrow or extend the scope of his attention.

Selective attention, then, is declared by Royce to be an essential characteristic of individuality.⁵¹ And it is in this significantly essential realm that our freedom is manifest: "Moral freedom is simply this freedom to hold attention, or to forget by inattention, an Ought already present to one's finite consciousness."⁵² In conclusion, I quote a most inclusive and apt passage from Royce:

Our theory is, that, despite all the causal dependence of the Self upon its own past, and upon all its social and natural conditions, just this act of attention, at this temporal instant, never occurred before, and will never occur again, and is, in so far, unique, individual, incapable of any complete causal explanation, and is, in consequence, the free act of this self.⁵³

In Bradley⁵⁴ we have seen that no validity was accorded our categories of willing and striving beyond the realm of mere appearance. Anything which tends to abstract the finite individual from his identification with the One Reality is discredited. Ends and purposes have no significance beyond the partial and fragmentary nature of our existence. Bosanquet,⁵⁵ we observed, rejected any kind of fatalism, straight or diluted, on the basis of its presenting a world externally determining the active agents within that world. These agents rather should be conceived as determinately encompassing their contents of activity, though those contents themselves be composed of necessary acts. Positively, Bosanquet declares freedom to consist in the capacity of the individual for a comprehensive response to his environment. In other words, his freedom consists in the degree to which the individual can get hold of his world in non-contradictory wholes. This means that there can be no genuine freedom in a pluralistic world, a world of externally opposing and determining "claims and counter-claims." To be truly free we should will the universal; and this we can do only as members of the One Reality. Royce⁵⁶ releases us from physical causation by offering us a more vital realm, the "World of Appreciation," a world wherein we know ourselves as possessed of eternal meanings. Our meanings are ex-

50. *Ibid.*, p. 355.

52. *Ibid.*, II, 360.

54. See *supra*, p. 38.

56. See *supra*, p. 41.

51. *Ibid.*, I, 449.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 359.

55. See *supra*, p. 38.

pressed through our moral autonomy. But our moral creativity is truly exercised by finding our places in the Absolute Will. We therefore become free by virtue of being unique parts of the Unique Whole. If, within this relation we have any ground of choice at all, it is in the fundamental matter of attention, narrowing or extending it to encompass a corresponding degree of the Whole, the ever-present Ought.

One implication at least is clear throughout our Absolutists' doctrine of freedom: there is no disposition to deny all possible meanings of the presence of freedom. Even Bradley recognizes activities, volitions, ends, and means within the finite spheres. The issue arises over matters of definition and of the application or scope of freedom.

Yet it is patent that in general our Absolutists accord no ultimate reality to the finite self. They all have recognized, however, in the finite individual an undeniable center of expression for the Real. As such a center, then, the finite individual must have some kind of nature. It becomes my purpose, then, to call attention to the nature attributed by these Absolutists to that finite self, and then to indicate what their positions on freedom consistently should be.

We find Bradley himself saying: "It is true that other selves and God are far more than mere ideal objects."⁵⁷ "On the contrary," he continues, "the wills of others can, as we say, be taken up into mine or mine resolved into theirs. And, however we phrase it, this real unity of emotion and action is most certain; and I know that God's will or that of others is carried out in my volition into actual fact."⁵⁸ This passage is significant to me in that the very "unity of emotion and action," so characteristically emphasized, obtains upon the condition of the various wills' being "taken up," each into another's will. This reveals what I consider a fundamental principle: that there can be no unity without the harmonized expression of distinct wills, wills which are aware of themselves as being "taken up" or as "taking up" the wills of one another. Bradley has said that he knows that "God's will or that of others" is done by him. There would be no meaning whatsoever in saying that any other will, another finite person's or God's, is carried out by a given will unless that given will has some inkling of what is going on.

It might be objected that this means only that God, or the Absolute—identical for the purposes of this argument—is becoming self-conscious of his own volition as being carried out. Yet the fact remains, aside from any question as to the Absolute's willing at all, that the universal experience is that we have finite individuals who, along with Bradley, are feeling and saying, "I know that God's will or that of others is carried out in my volition." We might amend this statement and say, "I am only the Absolute as he is conscious of himself at this point." Even so, how do we avoid the same principle? It remains that there

is a "point" which feels itself as a "point," with some distinction of its own as such a point.

We might say even, "The Absolute now is conscious of himself." This surely is a sufficient concession to our objector who insists that this conscious doing of each other's wills could have no significance other than an internal distinction within the Absolute, and could have no ultimate meaning in and for itself. But even here we have the distinguishable moment of the "now" as the necessary condition of the Absolute's being conscious of himself. How there can be any consciousness, especially of one's self, even for the Absolute, except it be centered in some identifiable "moment" or "point" I cannot conceive. Let me push the matter further with a closely related criticism. When the will of another, a finite person's, God's or the Absolute's is said to be carried out, there must be an intelligible idea-content to be expressed; there must be something to be carried out. Therefore, for an agent to know that he is carrying out the will of another, of God even, argues that he must be possessed of an appreciable degree of self-determination, at least enough to determine the degree of significance the carrying out of that other will has for him. Stated differently, the agent at least can determine himself so far as to have this appreciation of carrying out another's will.

Now this is far from establishing the freedom of Humanists like James, I know; and it probably is no advance over Royce's freedom. It may be only a personalism. It is of some worth, however, for me to register my insistence upon the necessity, even under an Absolutistic view, to recognize the distinct existence of wills and of their own appreciation of their actions.

Bosanquet has said that there is value in persons because they have the capacity to be ends or worlds.⁵⁹ I am aware that he has said on another occasion that minds—and since minds can exhaust in the fullness of their contents, the significance of persons for us, I take the terms to be synonymous—are imperfect media and manifestations of reality rather than an ultimate and sovereign source of it.⁶⁰ Granting for the moment all the contentions concerning the imperfection of finite minds, they still are admitted to be media and manifestations of the Real. It further is admitted that the most significant, yes, even the most essential expression of Reality, is to be discovered in those finite minds or persons.

Returning briefly to the charge of the finite mind's imperfection, I wish to remind the reader of my contentions in the section on evil:⁶¹ that our transcendent experience whereby we brand our finite selves as imperfect after all must still be our experience. There may be a source of inspiration for this idea of our imperfection, which necessarily implies an accepted standard of perfection, but the source is not such as to alter the fact of the experience's being ours, intelligible only as ours. For further emphasis on this point, the highest, most inclusive

59. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 308.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 126.

61. See *supra*, pp. 29–30 ff.

category of reality, individuality, has as its only concrete example which we can know these very finite persons who have the capacity to be ends-in-themselves or "worlds." It is true that we finite beings never arrive at the completeness of individuality that we desire. But the fact remains that we can know this only to the degree that we already are in possession of some degree of awareness of the standard. Royce, as we have noted, has recognized this. My point is, then, that whatever the source of the idea of imperfection may be, it is not such that it obliterates our personal identities. The capacities to be ends or worlds are not capacities in general; they always are our capacities. The ends are not ends *in abstracto*; they are our ends. The "worlds" are not "worlds" by mere theory; we are the "worlds."

At this point I should like to recall the recognition on the part of our Absolutists of the higher values of our experiences as most clearly indicative of reality and thus affording a fundamental motive for their philosophy. Without recounting all that argument, we can here attend to simple implications. First of all, in those higher experiences, such as the aesthetic, the social-moral, and the religious, there is the highest organization of the self. The higher the appreciation of the experience, the greater the organization. While absorption into the objects of these experiences is an essential characteristic, that does not mean the loss of identity or the obliteration of will. It is nearer the truth to say that we have achieved the greatest known expression of the will: an equilibrium of tensions, as in the aesthetic experience; a concentration of active interests, as in the social-moral experience; a pervasiveness of all our faculties and desires, as in the religious experience. Objections might be raised especially to this last characterization. But if, for instance, we grant the mystical experience to be most intensely representative of the religious experience, we find that, rather than the individual's will being atrophied, it is, at its best, exhilarated to its maximum.⁶²

From these characterizations of the self, to which our Absolutists have committed themselves in principle, it is to be deduced that for a self to be consistently such, it must be to that degree a self-determining being. These selves could not be even the virile, impressive revelations of the Absolute they are said to be at their best levels, if they were presented as passive, spineless creatures. The life which sets for us the model of reality is a life of creative will. Royce has admitted this.⁶³ Bosanquet has declared the self to be the creative principle of the universe.⁶⁴ This self may not make the stuff of his universe, but it is the agency that is modelling the stuff all the while into meaningful configurations in himself.

I am not necessarily interested just now in any quibble over the substantive

62. Bennett, C. A., *A Philosophical Study of Mysticism*, especially pp. 60-66.

63. *The Problem of Christianity*, II, 293-294.

64. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 354-355.

and the adjective. It is sufficient for my purpose to note this functional reality of selves. Minds, selves, are the very centers of "self-guidance of that world which appears as matter," says Bosanquet.⁶⁵ They are the only conditions we know for overcoming the "externality of the world," to use Bosanquet's phrase.⁶⁶ They are the absolute conditions of values. In short, Bosanquet declares, they are self-conscious microcosms. And I cannot refrain from interjecting here the conviction that he has thus surrendered his singularism. Self-consciousness as the "active form of totality," then, gives everything its character, its degree of import of the whole.⁶⁷

Here, it seems to me, Bosanquet has admitted a point for which I have been contending all along. This is further substantiated by the various observations of the Absolutists to the effect that natural laws are materials for us in the fulfilling of our desires; that even our categories of nature are socially evolved to meet the need for our interpretation of ourselves to each other through our environment.⁶⁸ Royce says that whoever "compares distinct ideas, and discovers the third or mediating idea which interprets the meaning of one in the light of the other, thereby discovers, or invents, a realm of conscious unity which constitutes the very essence of the life of reason."⁶⁹ The "Will to Interpret" is, we see, a creative activity. I see nothing in the Humanistic characterization of our creative activity of knowledge and truth, as "carving our constellations" from our world, which is incompatible with this position. This creative activity is illustrated in our selecting from the bewildering galaxy of stars, with an infinite number of possible configurations, just the configurations of our choice. Again, it is as if we were all creative artists, who might take within the frames of our portrayals any of an infinite number of possible outlined fields, but who choose just the one of our interests. The definiteness, the order, the progression of our world all are marshalled in the ranks of the creative wills' interpretations. This does not derogate from the systematic lawfulness of mind; there is nothing contradictory between this and mind's creativeness.⁷⁰ We create lawfully.

Out of these considerations of the self, I am constrained to ask: if the self is essentially a creative self, selecting from the bewildering externality of the world, and through that selectiveness giving the world the only intelligibility we know, ought not the Absolutists to take this self at more of its face value? To deny the ultimate reality of our creativity is to minimize, if not to destroy the values we say are produced through our creative will. Our Absolutists themselves have admitted that the sense of freedom is an essential condition for our values and especially for our moral values.⁷¹ Just above I have tried to indicate

65. *Ibid.*, pp. 193-194.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 337.

67. *Studies of Good and Evil*, p. 133.

69. *The Problem of Christianity*, II, 188.

70. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 4.

71. See *supra*, pp. 38, 39, 41, 41-42, especially p. 43.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 216.

that any considerable experience of value involves some degree of self-determinism even though it be confined to an appreciation of the experience.⁷² Any appreciation of ourselves, even as doing another's will, is one which is ours and indelibly ours. For our willing is an ineradicable element at those levels where we are aware of our producing and participating in and, to a degree, shaping the factors involved in the experience of a value.

Convince a man that he was only deluded and did not arise to a creation or creative appreciation of a value. How long will the value persist? Suppose we admit the Absolutists' contention that the finite will realizes the perfecting of its values only by the union of its will with the Absolute. After the analogy of the religious consciousness, the finite will is said to surrender its finite self-hood into the Absolute to attain the fullness of its self-hood. I might here cite a long array of quotations with reference to this transcendence;⁷³ but we hardly need to repeat that which has become familiar by this time. The essence of all those quotations is that intimated just above: that in the submission of losing of ourselves, we realize ourselves most completely. Let us note, then, that the very point of such a doctrine is the conservation of a more complete experience of ourselves. If the submission, the transcendence, or whatever it should be called, is to maintain its intended significance, it must be an act of our own wills. Otherwise I cannot see how we should have in the experience anything of the value it is supposed to afford. I submit my will but it is my will submitting; and it continues to be my will that is submitted. In religious devotion or Absolutistic fervor one might say, "God, or the Absolute, wills in me."

Again I insist upon my oft-recurring but vital point that this very appreciation of the experience as having religious value is an expression of my will. No matter how much I might minimize the activity of myself in the interpretation of my experience, an inseparable and necessary factor in the experience is my distinguishing my acceptance and appreciation as the essential features of the experience. Without this, how could the experience have any value? And this, it seems to me, is an ultimate which never can be resolved, yes, which never should be. It means the unresolved multiplicity of our wills as wills. Perhaps I should say plurality instead of multiplicity, for I do not wish my position to be confused with Bosanquet's Multiplicism.⁷⁴ Bosanquet admits as the only vital or ultimate distinctions in his world, those of various grades or levels of being. I am insisting upon a positive plurality of finite wills as beings creative of their own values and, therefore, of the primary significance of their lives.

The Absolutists have given a measure of recognition to this principle in their

72. See *supra*, pp. 47 f.

73. *Appearance and Reality*, p. 441; *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 432; *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, pp. 4, 10, 225-226; *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 250; *The World and the Individual*, II, 294, 323-324; *ibid.*, I, 348, 455-458, 462.

74. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 373 ff.

assurance that in the Absolute no appearance can be lost, that each contributes and is necessary to the Whole. This has been said in a number of ways: we are microcosms, "threads of the Absolute's Life," "separate streams in the Absolute Flood";⁷⁵ the Absolute absorbs nature "through the world of selves";⁷⁶ pain and evil are contributing, as within our vital experiences, to the character of the Whole;⁷⁷ and, finally, Royce has declared that the Whole would not be what it is without each finite purpose in its own uniqueness.⁷⁸ Royce has further put it in terms of religion: "For the God who loves me demands not that I should be nothing, but that I should be his own."⁷⁹

The crucial question is, then, what kind of a relation is this being in God or in the Absolute. In direct answer, I repeat that which I advanced just above, viz., that whatever else the relation to a "Greater" in our world might be, it cannot resolve the ultimacy of our wills as wills. No matter how much we might argue for the internality of relations, nor how much we might insist upon an immanence of the Absolute within us, that immanence has no intelligibility aside from the concrete centers of experience and the fact remains that those relations mean nothing except for the conscious centers which can acknowledge, define, and locate them. Relations in abstraction mean nothing to us. In short, what more can this inclusion in the Absolute validly mean than a postulated need for a unity that will hang together, a meeting-ground for all the multiplicity and plurality of wills and willed purposes? We can agree with the Absolutists on the necessity for a common meeting-ground. The point is that such a ground is a meeting-ground and not a monistic base.

I do not intend to give a positive picture by my term "meeting-ground." For the present, I would simply suggest it as connoting a much looser sort of relation among the finite wills than the monism of the Absolutist would admit. For instance, I do not admit any general will which means anything more than an agreement upon the part of many finite wills. I reject Bosanquet's organic view of society,⁸⁰ for example, which is illustrative of the Absolute.

Now if a consistent recognition of our value-experiences as a criterion of reality leads to a recognition of the ultimacy of our creative wills and an acknowledgment of ourselves as maintained in our essential characters in the Absolute, how can a strict monism be held? To me it seems clear that consistently the Absolute can be held to be no more than the general ground of similarity, or the general drift of experience, or a general agreement of wills or purposes. Looking at the question from another angle, the Absolute seems Eternal, the All, and, therefore, as doing no willing in the sense of perfecting

75. *Appearance and Reality*, p. 456; *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 129.

76. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 382.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 277.

78. *The World and Individual*, I, 465.

79. *The Problem of Christianity*, I, 81.

80. *The Philosophical Theory of the State*, especially pp. 155-179.

itself; then why should we finite creatures be continually stimulated to expansive or perfecting effort? If the Absolute is all that is, why should it desire or will to be any more than it is? Is it not just as much the Absolute if we all remain as content as jelly-fish as it would be if we all were as ambitious as college sophomores?

Yet, if we admit the vitality of the moral consciousness and its satisfactions, the Absolute is different after we have willed and attained our purposes and our satisfactions.⁸¹ It might be objected that this makes no difference, for the Absolute includes both before and after. I rejoin that if we take seriously the distinctions before and after—for which I have contended in the discussion on time—something has come to be in the Absolute which was not. Bosanquet, as I have noted before, recognizes the rise of minds, for instance, which were not in existence until the conditions were ripe.⁸² Royce has acclaimed the enriching of the Divine Community by the contributions of the finite wills.⁸³ Now if the Absolute did not will our moral attainment in any instance, it could not be the fully determinate Being it is supposed to be; for there would be willing going on to which it was indifferent or over which it might have no control. But if the Absolute did will our moral attainment, it must have been lacking in something and aware of that lack; in which case it could not have been the Absolute.

I am perfectly aware of the Absolutistic injunctions against taking the Absolute as a moral person. But if we are bound to consider the Absolute as realizing itself somehow through the finite, willing beings, and since those finite beings are revealing that realization by very virtue of themselves as willing and achieving beings, how can we hold to an Absolute who is indifferent to these significant revelations of itself? I cannot insist too strongly on this point. So I repeat that the Absolute consistently can mean no more than the Humanistic general drift of experience if we look at it from the point of view of its including the particulars; or that it can be no more than the God of Theism if we look at it from the point of view of purpose and value.

Corroboration is found in Bosanquet, though beyond his intentions: "In principle, we see, the Absolute is only the totality of a hold on reality which permeates in its degree all the conscious creatures of the creation, and uses all its externality."⁸⁴ And I should emphasize the fact that this "totality of a hold on reality" can mean to us nothing more than such a hold as can be had by a Will; and that only such a totality can be meant as does permeate or is contained within the cumulative minds of the conscious creatures, including God's. In other words, the totality is nothing more than the interplay of all the centers and influences of the world. And we, creatures fashioned in this interplay, are

81. Cf. *The World and the Individual*, II, 328.

82. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, Lecture V.

83. *The Problem of Christianity*, II, 64 ff.

84. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 382.

responsive in varying degrees to it, rising to meet its stimulations with our own selective, creative wills. Whatever influences exceed those of the stimulations of our environment and of our own creative responses must be in terms of a Will that guides us through influences to mean anything to us.

Out of all this argument I probably have come no nearer a positive establishing of freedom metaphysically than have those I am criticizing. But that has not been my direct aim, which has been rather to indicate that our Absolutists' doctrines of the self as a center of the revelation of the Absolute show that self to be of such a character as to take on an irreducible reality of its own; and that the value-experiences of the self, taken as models of reality by the Absolutists point to a creativity of will that must be an unresolvable element to maintain the vitality of those values. Therefore, it has been my simple contention that the sense of freedom must be maintained as an ultimate.

An objector might say this goes no further than Bosanquet's characterization of freedom as one's "being equal to the occasion"⁸⁵ in a finely determinate adjustment, in willing the universal; or that it does not go beyond Royce's designation of freedom as one's fulfilling his unique place in the Whole.⁸⁶ It is true that these characterizations of freedom are psychological only. Our sense of freedom naturally involves our feeling ourselves as free from any obstructions and contradictions, and positively, as being in full command of the situation in question. Also it involves feeling that we are filling our own peculiar places and that in so doing we are thus far uncaused by any external forces. We may have to employ many "necessary acts," to use Bosanquet's phrase, but in being just our unique selves, nothing else determines us.

Well, again it is admitted that at bottom, all these are psychological. They do not answer the fundamental metaphysical questions: whether our "being equal to the occasion" is determined simply by the pressure of the Whole upon us through no inherent power of initiation of our own; whether we will the universal or the Absolute simply determines it in us; whether the unique places we fill are of our choosing or simply our falling into the niches prepared for us with no recourse of our own. These questions have not been answered, I know. But, I repeat, it is not incumbent upon me to answer them. I have admitted the extreme difficulty of obtaining any direct metaphysical proof for freedom.

It should be recalled further that Humanistic arguments are based largely upon the implications of the moral consciousness and its claims. In other words, we build a world around the central and imperative values and demands of the moral consciousness. That which is most vital to our existence, to our understanding of our world, should rightly dictate the terms of its world. Therefore, on these grounds I have criticized our Absolutists; and have tried to indicate that their psychological admissions have no value unless we postulate the "loose-

85. See *supra*, p. 39.

86. See *supra*, p. 42.

jointed" world of the Humanist, and elevate the will to an ultimate place in the essence of reality.

This essay has been devoted to an attempt to reveal the Absolutists' denial of the ultimate significance of time, evil, and freedom as inconsistent with their own fundamental premises; and, positively, to reveal them, if consistent, as being under obligation to accept the Humanistic position on those issues.

With reference to time,⁸⁷ I have tried to establish my position with the arguments that there can be no wholes of "logical intention" without the vital maintenance of the parts in their succession. I am at a loss to understand how any development, even a logical one, can be a development and have any significance as such without the employment of temporal succession. We simply are incapable of comprehending any wholes instanter. The wholes are such to us because they are comprehended in intelligible processes. I further have suggested the only sense in which the "eternal unity of meaning" or concept of "completeness" can have any meaning for us. We cannot comprehend a completeness in any actual experience or in the aggregate of our experiences. So "completeness," the "eternal unity of meaning" are, so far as they are intelligible to us, simply generalized projections of any significant series of experiences into all possible future time; for we cannot transcend in our understanding any continuity with our time-involved experience, no matter how inclusive that transcendent realm may be. Further, I have emphasized the central importance of the moral consciousness, even as recognized by the Absolutists, and have contended for the necessary ultimacy of time-processes for that consciousness. Finally, in a more explicit treatment of the relation of the finite individual and the Absolute, we observed the Absolutists' characterization of the Absolute as transfiguring the finite incompleteness. As a corollary to this, the self was described as quite otherwise than a "fixed essence," but rather as a functional center winning its self-hood in a process of fluctuation. Now these two doctrines I have taken as indicating the ultimate vitality of time processes. If the Absolute functions essentially in the process of transmuting—and Bosanquet, for instance, accepts an evolutionary point of view of the cosmos—and if this is revealed through the inevitable processes of struggling by the finites, time is an ineradicable element of Reality. Royce's Community, which is the clearest revelation of the significance of the Absolute, is vitalized by the continuous enrichment of the coming and going and development of the finite individuals who live their lives in time.

My arguments for the ultimate significance of good-and-evil⁸⁸ centered about the moral consciousness in true Humanistic style. It was contended that the possibility of evil was an ineradicable condition of the moral consciousness.

87. See *supra*, pp. 12 ff.

88. See *supra*, pp. 29 ff.

To this even our Absolutists gave an assent. Now good and evil, we noted upon the suggestion of the Absolutists, most notably Bosanquet, are not to be identified with any peculiar content; they are not attributable to any duality of mind, but to the attitude of will which results in too narrow a view, in some kind of obstruction which keeps us from fulfilment of our purposes. This latter clause represents especially Royce's view. The outcome is that we cannot know the self except through his expressions which are for him good and evil. These expressions are essential revelations of him. I then carried the argument to the point of showing that evil was a continuously necessary condition. The essence of the moral consciousness, which most truly represents us, is the overcoming of evil. But evil is overcome only by continued experience. And in continued experience, while it is overcome, the evil maintains its identity as that evil. Otherwise the overcoming would have no significance. There is no transcendence in the abstract; we must transcend in continuity with our past experience; and that means the continued possibility of evil. This is evident in the struggles of the highly moral man, who struggles as hard on his elevated plane as the less moral man on his lower one. Further, as is suggested in Royce's "Loyalty" and Bosanquet's "Principle of Negativity," we are more truly selves to the degree that we are pressing our boundaries before us and redoubling our efforts.

The final question faced in my criticism was the significance of the absorption of evil into the Absolute. My contention was that there could be no absorption intelligible to us—and of what use is there to talk about any other kind?—other than that analogous to our own experience. Royce has proclaimed the highest good possible to be that of the "good fight." God is fulfilled through our suffering. Bosanquet has declared that we live the "principle of the Absolute" in our transmuting hardships, sufferings, and defeats into positive meanings and staunch fiber. Bradley has admitted that "better or worse" makes a difference to the Absolute and the Absolute "over-rules" the evil. In all this I have seen nothing which is intelligible but that which is after the analogy of our own experiences. Therefore, for the transmutations to have any meaning, the evils which are overcome in the Absolute must maintain an ultimate identity as the evils that were overcome. The Absolute becomes most intelligible to us when we recognize it as a postulate to take care of our own failures; to guarantee our own indifferent success in overcoming evil. And this in turn is more intelligible in a world with genuine alternatives, which alternatives can account for our erroneous choices. The dependence that we feel upon something greater than ourselves to redeem our meager success is intelligible in terms of a Theistic God who can appreciate our struggles. This is much more intelligible than is an Absolute Being who absorbs our imperfection and yet condemns us as finite creatures to be essentially different from the Absolute Perfection or else to lose our ultimate reality as selves.

Finally, I attacked the Absolutists' doctrine of freedom⁸⁹ from the basis of their essential characterization of the self; and from this I attempted to show what, consistently, I thought their doctrine should be. I called attention to Bradley's description of our experience as "taking up" the wills of others and of others', including God's, "taking up" our wills. Attention was further called to Bosanquet's attributing supreme value to the self as being a possible end or "world." From these considerations I inferred the necessity of accepting the ultimate significance of the finite's will as appreciative of itself as such a "world" and as "taking up" or being "taken up" in the wills of others. Otherwise there could be no meaning in such expressions; and we could not rightly say that any will was done at all. The recognition of selves as "worlds" or, as Bosanquet has characterized them again, as the creative principle of the universe, as microcosms, as self-conscious and active "forms of totality" further attests the ultimate significance of that self. Royce's "Will to Interpret" is additional testimony to the ultimate and creative activity and significance of the self in shaping its world. Again, on the basis of the Absolutists' appreciation of the higher experiences of values, I have argued that the self should be credited with an ultimate creativity. Otherwise, we hardly could talk in terms of values at all for it.

Then I faced more explicitly the issue of the relation of the finite will to the Absolute. I took cognizance of the fact that the finite self has been admitted by the Absolutists as the necessary center of the Absolute's expression of himself. The import of that I took to be that we never could obviate the necessity for the finite center to have some positive nature, since it is only through him that the Absolute is known. Again, the very losing of ourselves in the Absolute, we have been told, insures the realization of our true and full selves. So again the realization of the self seems to be a basic principle. And if it be true, the experience of losing one's self in the Absolute can have its desired value only as the self holds its identity as a condition for appreciation of its experience.

The last item in the argument took its cue from the Absolutists' admission that nothing of our essential natures was lost in the Absolute. Then the Absolute cannot be indifferent to that which is most vital and essential to us, viz., our moral wills. What more, then, can the Absolute intelligibly mean than the postulated ground for the coöperation of the finite selves? How can it be more than the inclusive ground of the "drifts" or "blocks" of experience the Humanist discusses, if we look at it from the aspect of its inclusiveness? Or what can it be more than the God of Theism, if we look at it from the aspect of an influencing Will? Now in all this I acknowledged I had not established any proof of metaphysical freedom. But I have taken my stand upon a defense of the Humanistic position: i.e., that which is the most vital element of our experience has the right to construct a world that will best substantiate itself. The

89. See *supra*, pp. 44 ff.

moral will, it is insisted, is the most vital element of our universe. The reality of freedom, then, is maintained as essential to the nature of the moral will. A world of actual alternatives, a world whose parts afford a looseness of interplay, whose complete unity or harmonization is ahead of it, if it is held as at all possible, rather than eternally present, becomes for us the most intelligible world.

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